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The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use
Abraham Bellt & Gideon Parchomovskytt
Fairuse is one of modern law's most fascinatingand troublingdoctrines. It is
amorphous and vague, as well as notoriously difficult to apply. It is, at the same
time, vitally importantin copyright and perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated issue in the law of intellectualproperty.
This Article synthesizes themes from the rich literatureon fair use to fashion a
novel theory of fair use that provides both a better understandingof the underlying
principlesand better tools for applying the doctrine.
In contrast to the dominant understandingof fair use in the literature-that
fair use addresses market failures-theArticle proposes that fair use is a tool that
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allocates a large bloc of uses directly to thepublic in order to limit the size of property
rights that are granted to authors. The fair use doctrine, we argue, is an integral
part of copyright's sortingmechanism for, on the one hand,grantingauthors intellectual property rights based on their expected incentives for creation and, on the
other hand,granting the public privileges based on the expected utility from direct
allocation.The Article's theory thus accords with recent Supreme Court cases by conceptualizingfair use not as an exception for costly transactions,but ratheras a centralfeature of the copyright system that ensuresproductive and allocative efficiency.
This theory supports a reconceptualizationof the basic structure of copyright
law that both broadensfair use and makes the doctrine easier to apply. This Article
favors a primafacie finding of fair use whenever the user's category of use is one that
produces widespreadfollow-on utility to nonusers (such as the categoriesofpolitical
speech or what we call "truth seeking'). This prima facie finding can be defeated
only by showing that allowing such uses with respect to the particularcopyrighted
work would eliminate sufficient incentives for its creation.
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INTRODUCTION

Fair use is one of modern law's most fascinating and troubling doctrines. It is amorphous and vague, and it is notoriously
difficult to apply.' At the same time, fair use is vitally important
in copyright. The fair use defense to copyright infringement is
perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated defense in the
law of intellectual property.2 While fair use appears as the first in
a series of defenses and mandatory licenses in the Copyright Act
of 1976,3 it is seen as much more than that. Fair use is a keystone
of the law of copyright; the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that fair use is a constitutionally mandated limitation on copyright in order to avoid conflicts between the First Amendment's
free speech protections and the monopoly rights copyright owners
4
receive over expressions.
Yet scholars have struggled to explain why and how fair use
should work. Following Professor Wendy Gordon's immensely influential article, the most dominant theory of fair use is inextricably related to the notion of market failure. 5 The market-failure
approach argues that the fair use doctrine is best understood as
a mechanism for enabling the use of copyrighted works without
authorization when the cost of transacting to obtain the authorization is prohibitive and would block voluntary transactions. 6
Fair use, in other words, is a doctrine for small uses-those on
which the user and owner would agree but for the high cost of
locating one another and negotiating an agreement. Gordon has
since significantly developed her own positions on fair use,7 but
1 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 NC L Rev 1087, 1093-95 (2007);
Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of U.S. Copyright FairUse Opinions, 1978-2005, 156
U Pa L Rev 549, 551-53 (2008).
2
Paul Siegel, Communication Law in America 237 (Rowman & Littlefield 2014).
See also David Nimmer, 'Fairestof Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 L &
Contemp Probs 263, 266-67 (Winter/Spring 2003).
3 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified as amended at 17 USC § 101 et seq. For
the statutory section on fair use, see 17 USC § 107.
4 See, for example, Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 219-20 (2003) (describing fair
use as a "built-in First Amendment accommodation[ I");
Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc v
Nation Enterprises,471 US 539, 555-60 (1985) (describing the "First Amendment protections ...embodied in... the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded
by fair use").
5 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 Colum L Rev 1600 (1982).
6 See generally id.
7 See generally, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justificationin the Law
of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the Story, 50 J Copyright Society
USA 149 (2003) (describing the specific instances when market failure should justify a
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the ingenious explanation in her original article has captured the
field.8 Unfortunately, the now-standard justification suffers from
several troubling features that have been only partly addressed
by subsequent writings.
One problem with the market-failure explanation is descriptive. The market-failure theory characterizes fair use as an exception to-even an anomaly within-the rule that copyright owners
have the right to charge for all uses (unless, of course, transaction
costs prevent them from doing so). This diverges from judicial understandings of fair use that have made fair use central to the
constitutional balance between copyright and free speech.9 This
gap between the market-failure theory and the perceived judicial
importance of fair use is likely to become more pronounced over
time. As technology lowers transaction costs, 10 there is less reason
to recognize fair uses, dooming the market-failure explanation of
fair use to eternal contraction.
A second, and more fundamental, problem with the marketfailure theory is conceptual. As we show, the market-failure theory
implicitly presumes that the efficient economic strategy for allocating copyright rights is to grant them in their entirety to the

finding of fair use); Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failureand Intellectual Property: A Response to ProfessorLunney, 82 BU L Rev 1031 (2002) (describing how the original marketfailure test for fair use has been misinterpreted as a mechanism to limit fair use).
8
For some illustrative examples of the application of this framework, see generally
Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U Colo L Rev 53
(2014); Christina Chung, Note, Holy Fandom, Batman! CommercialFan Works, Fair Use,
and the Economics of Complements and Market Failure,19 BU J Sci & Tech L 367 (2013);
Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 Berkeley
Tech L J 1379 (2012); Ryan Kairalla, Work as Weapon, Author as Target: Why Parodies
That Target Authors (Not Just Their Works) Should Be Fair Uses, 2 NYU J Intel Prop &
Enter L 227 (2012); Matthew Sag, PredictingFair Use, 73 Ohio St L J 47 (2012); Lydia
Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market FailureApproach to FairUse in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5 J Intel Prop L 1 (1997).
9 See Sarl Louis Feraud Internationalv Viewfinder, Inc, 489 F3d 474, 482 (2d Cir
2007) (discussing how fair use "balances the competing interests of the copyright laws and
the First Amendment); Eldred, 537 US at 220 (noting that fair use doctrine is one of
copyright's "traditional First Amendment safeguards'); A&M Records, Inc v Napster,Inc,
239 F3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir 2001) ("We note that First Amendment concerns in copyright
are allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine."); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc v Coinline Business Data, Inc, 166 F3d 65, 74-75 (2d Cir 1999) ("First Amendment concerns
[relating to copyright injunctions] are protected by and coextensive with fair use doctrine.'); Maxtone-Graham v Burtchaell, 631 F Supp 1432, 1435 (SDNY 1986) ("To satisfy
[ ] First Amendment requirements, [clourts have mitigated the chilling effects of copyright
law upon free expression.., by developing... Fair Use.').
10 Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets and Systems: Business Innovation and Information Technology 74-76 (Cambridge 1993). See also generally Antonio Cordella, Transaction Costs and Information Systems: Does ITAdd Up?, 21 J Info Tech 195 (2006).
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author. However, we show that, for intellectual property, productive efficiency may be best ensured by allocating many use privileges directly to users. Indeed, the most efficient allocation of copyright includes the grant of fair use privileges to users even when
transactions for such uses would not fall prey to market failure."1
In this Article, we offer a novel theory of fair use based on
this insight into the effects of allocation on productive efficiency
and societal welfare. Our theory provides a basis for a robust fair
use doctrine that protects the public interest in free speech and
maintains the incentive structure of copyright law that is vital to
the creation of expressive works. It has the added benefit of reducing, though not entirely eliminating, the ambiguity that has
attended fair use cases since the doctrine's inception.
Rejecting the conventional wisdom on fair use, we claim that
copyright law should be viewed as granting not one, but two large
blocs of legal protections: a grant of fair use privileges to the public and a grant of exclusive rights to authors. The grant of exclusive rights to authors (such as the rights to copy, distribute, and
display) is intended to give authors the ability to profit enough
from their expressions to make it worthwhile for them to continue
creating.12 The grant of fair use privileges to the public, by contrast, is intended to expand use of the creations by giving the public the privilege of utilizing creative expressions for uses that create significant follow-on utility for nonusers (such as political
speech and truth seeking).13 Thus, fair use is not simply an allocation of rights for minor uses. It is a grant of privileges as fundamentally important to the aims of copyright as the grant of
rights to the author. In opr conception, one should not look at fair
use privileges as simply residual or carved out from authors'
rights. It is just as valid to view authors' rights as residual or
carved out from the fair use privilege.
This dual grant of rights to authors and privileges to users is
designed to meet the dual goals of incentivizing authors to create
works and encouraging efficient use of works by users. Unfortunately, the dual constitutional aims of incentivizing creation of
11 See generally Glynn S. Lunney Jr, Fair Use and Market Failure:Sony Revisited,
82 BU L Rev 975 (2002).
12 Justin Hughes, Fair Use across Time, 50 UCLA L Rev 775, 797 (2003); Joseph P.
Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich L Rev 409, 428 (2002); Stewart E. Sterk,
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich L Rev 1197, 1198-1204 (1996).
13 The terminology of rights and privileges is taken from the classic typology of Professor Wesley Hohfeld. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal
Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 Yale L J 16,(1913).
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new works and ensuring their use by the public exist in some tension. Each grant of rights to the author of a copyrighted work expands the domain of rights enjoyed by the copyright owner (increasing incentives) while simultaneously restricting the use
privileges of the public in that same expression. Likewise, each
grant of privileges to users increases the use of works while curbing the value of incentives granted to the authors. In deciding
whether to grant any particular right to authors, lawmakers must
take account of this double effect, balancing the positive effect of
the increased marginal incentives for authors that are created by
the grant with the negative effect of the losses of public use of the
expression in accordance with the right. Conversely, each grant
of a privilege to the public to use otherwise-protected expressions
requires lawmakers to balance in the opposite direction: the privilege expands public use at the expense of marginal incentive effects for creation.
An important predicate of our theory is that incentivizing creativity does not necessitate granting all possible exclusive rights
to authors in perpetuity. Granting this package to authors would
actually result in a net social loss.14 In a world with positive transaction costs, exclusive rights to authors, by necessity, eliminate
some kinds of uses by nonauthors and future authors.', At the
same time, infinite protection is not necessary to incentivize the
creation of most works, and therefore it is not desirable. Indeed,
the more protection granted to authors, the more likely it is that
society is overpaying. Hence, the optimal incentive structure involves giving only some rights and powers to authors-just
enough to motivate the creation of original works-while reserving the remaining rights and powers to the public.16 We contend
that fair use is one of the key means by which this division should
be effected. Fair use helps filter protections to ensure efficient allocation of uses to societally favored users while still fully maintaining the incentive effects of copyright protection for authors.
A second important predicate of our theory is the insight that,
absent the need to incentivize production of expressive works, it
would be best to allow the public full and unfettered use of all

14 Oren Bracha and Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm?ProductDifferentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 Tex L Rev 1841, 1884-85 (2014); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreseeabilityand Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv L Rev 1569, 1589-91 (2009).
15 See Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1613 (cited in note 5).
16 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 341-44 (1989).
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expressions, irrespective of their origin. This is due to the fact
that expressive works are nonrivalrous in their consumption.17
That is to say, the use of an expressive work by any particular
consumer does not diminish in any way the ability of another user
to consume it. A million people can read William Shakespeare's
Hamlet, and the words will remain undiminished for the millionthand-first reader.
Given this state of affairs, the optimal fair use doctrine would
limit rights strictly to those necessary to incentivize creation,
while leaving the public to consume copyrighted works without
restriction beyond that minimum. Ordinarily, we think of this
balance as being struck by giving authors time-limited exclusive
rights and giving the public unlimited use of the works once those
rights have expired. But, as we show, there is actually a better
way to reach the balance. The law can grant rights to authors that
are prima facie larger than necessary to incentivize, while at the
same time cutting away from those rights by allocating extensive
use privileges to the public. Allocating use privileges directly to
users can produce significant societal benefits, especially when
the privileges focus on uses that produce significant follow-on
benefits to other members of the public. Such an allocation not
only ensures the exercise of use privileges by those who find them
valuable, saving the cost of transferring those rights from owner
to user, but it also ensures the benefits of uses that create positive
externalities for the nonconsuming public. Allocating the uses directly to users also reduces ancillary costs, such as search costs
that are saved by users' self-selection.
Accordingly, we posit that the fair use doctrine should be primarily concerned with preserving public privileges in uses that
themselves produce the most widely spread benefits to the public.
Specifically, the fair use doctrine should enable consumers to utilize expressive works without the consent of the author when the
uses create widespread follow-on benefits throughout society.
The key to creating a viable dual-grant strategy of copyright,
of course, is producing a workable dividing line between privileged uses and protected rights. In considering the allocation of
authors' rights and public privileges, it must be borne in mind
that not all uses of expressive works are created equal. Some uses
of expressive works bring about broad-based benefits to society.
For instance, as scholarship and discussion about the First

17

Lunney, 82 BU L Rev at 994-95 (cited in note 11).
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Amendment observes, the Constitution expects the state to be
particularly solicitous of political speech.18 Likewise, the Copyright Clause9 reveals a societal interest in encouraging science
and the pursuit of knowledge. Stated otherwise, the state seeks to
promote the pursuit of truth2o as a valuable goal in and of itself.21
Other categories, such as education ("teaching," in the terminology
of the Copyright Act), are found directly in § 107 of the Act.22
Accordingly, uses of highly dispersed social value should be
considered presumptively public under the auspices of the fair use
doctrine, and only in extreme cases should the public be deprived
of them. By contrast, other types of uses-first and foremost,
standard commercial uses-should be considered to be within the
scope of the rights granted exclusively to authors. In other words,
in the case of standard commercial uses, the reverse legal presumption should obtain-that is, unauthorized uses are typically
not fair, unless there are special circumstances that justify denying exclusivity to authors, such as market failure. Here, the value
to the public of the uses is likely to be directly translated into
benefits to authors, and the standard copyright protections
should obtain.
Our reconceptualization of fair use has a significant doctrinal
payoff. Most importantly, our fair use conception requires courts
applying fair use to be sensitive to the degree of copyright protection offered more generally. An expansion of rights granted to authors, such as the extension of copyright protection for an additional twenty years, 23 should be matched by an expansion of fair
18 See Lillian R. BeVier, The FirstAmendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan L Rev 299, 304-22 (1978) (analyzing a
variety of sources to conclude that the First Amendment, at a minimum, "protects the
process of forming and expressing the will of the majority according to which our representatives must govern").
19 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. We refer to this clause as the "Copyright Clause," as we
are interested in only its reference to copyright law. The Clause refers to patent law as
well, and it might more accurately be labeled the "Intellectual Property Clause."
20 See Hustler Magazine, Inc v Falwell, 485 US 46, 52 (1988) (stressing the significance of the "truth-seeking function" of the First Amendment); Patrick Garry, The First
Amendment and Freedom of the Press: A Revised Approach to the Marketplace of Ideas
Concept, 72 Marq L Rev 187, 197 (1989); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1, 6-8.
21 In this Article, we take these constitutional values as givens.
22 17 USC § 107 ("Mhe fair use of a copyrighted work, including ... for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching[, ... scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright.").
23 Such an extension was implemented by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (1998), codified as amended at 17 USC §§ 108, 203,
301-04.
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use privileges in order to once again balance the competing impulses of copyright law.
To implement our proposed conception of fair use, we propose
a new doctrinal mechanism for identifying and upholding fair
uses. Under our conceptualization of fair use, whenever the intent
behind any use of an expressive work is for one of the aims of fair
use, the use should be considered prima facie "fair" and permitted.
Our definition of inherently public uses encompasses several of the
presumptively fair uses in the preamble of § 107 of the Copyright
Act, such as research and news reporting.24 To us, political speech,
the pursuit of factual accuracy, and scientific advancement
should be put on equal footing with, if not above, the illustrative
uses in § 107. Within the ambit of truth seeking, we would also
grant privileged status to new technological projects aimed at the
enhancement and spread of knowledge, such as Google Books,25
even though they are not listed in the preamble of § 107.
At the same time, we maintain that some of the uses described as favored in fair use jurisprudence, such as parodic uses,
need not be considered presumptively "fair." More generally, we
suggest as a rule of thumb that any categories of uses that create
significant nonpecuniary benefits to follow-on users (that is, subsequent consumers of the expression that will be utilizing the use
that is now claimed to be "fair") should be considered fair uses.
The dual-grant theory of fair use that we advocate brings
some needed coherence to the doctrine of fair use. It provides a
better account of some of the key themes in recent case law, while
at the same time suggesting that different results should have
been reached in several of the cases. More importantly, we show
how our approach can reduce some of the ambiguity surrounding
fair use decisions, and we lend greater clarity to the statutory
framework.
Our Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we explore current understandings of fair use and, in particular, the dominant
market-failure theory. In Part II, we present our contribution to
fair use theory by offering an alternative understanding of the
fair use doctrine, focusing, in particular, on how fair use is an efficient allocation of use privileges to the public at large. In
Part III, we present our contribution to fair use doctrine by proposing alterations that implement our understanding of the role

24 17 USC § 107.
25 See Part III.C.2.b.
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of fair use. Finally, in Part IV, we explore the interface between
our theory of fair use and other writings on copyright, property,
and free speech.
I. CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF FAIR USE

A.

The Market-Failure Understanding of Fair Use

The predominant theoretical justification of the fair use doctrine stems from an article by Professor Gordon over three decades ago. 26 In an article that has become a classic among intellectual property scholars,27 Gordon tied fair use to the economic
notion of market failure resulting from high transaction costs. 28
To understand Gordon's important insight, it is necessary to take
a step back and begin with the animating philosophy that underlies the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Article I, § 8 of the
Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."29 As many scholars have pointed out, the constitutional language suggests that the Framers viewed intellectual
property protection as a means to an end, namely, to encourage
the production of inventions and works of authorship.30
The grant of exclusive rights in intellectual goods in the form
of copyright (and patent) protection has a double effect, both negative and positive. The negative effect of conferring protection is
to take away certain rights from the public. If a work is protected
by the law of copyright, the public may no longer copy, adapt, or
otherwise use the work at will. At the same time, the grant has
the positive effect of depositing all these rights in the control of
the authors. Together, these two effects direct those users who
wish to use copyrighted works to transact with authors and pay
authors for the privilege of using their works of authorship. Importantly, it is the latter effect-authors' ownership of rights-

26

See generally Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev 1600 (cited in note 5).

27

See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction:Fair Use beyond

Market Failure, 18 Berkeley Tech L J 539, 542 (2003); Christina Bohannan, Copyright
Harm, Foreseeability,and Fair Use, 85 Wash U L Rev 969, 972 n 15 (2007).

See generally Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev 1600 (cited in note 5).
US Const Art I,§ 8, cl 8.
30 Balganesh, 122 Harv L Rev at 1576-77 & n 16 (cited in note 14). See also Landes
and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 326 (cited in note 16) (emphasizing that one of copyright
law's central goals is to maintain incentives for individuals to produce creative works).
28

29
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that induces users to pay authors through voluntary market
transactions and that thereby incentivizes authors to keep creating.
It is imperative to understand, however, that the grant of exclusivity via copyright protection does not by itself guarantee pecuniary rewards to authors. Indeed, most authors discover that
even though their works receive extensive copyright protection,
no commercial success is forthcoming.31 On its own, legal exclusivity gives little to authors. It is merely a background condition
necessary for the formation of markets. The actual remuneration
of authors is decided by two parameters that are partly exogenous
to the law. The first is the utility enjoyed by users. The second is
transaction costs.
As Professor Ronald Coase stressed in his seminal article The
Problem of Social Cost, it is only in the imaginary world without
transaction costs that we can be certain that voluntary market
transactions will inexorably lead to the efficient allocation of resources. 32 In the real world, transaction costs are an ever-present
influence on economic activity. These costs include expenditures
on identifying the relevant counterparty, negotiating with it, formulating legal agreements, and, on some views, incurring enforcement costs. 33 If transaction costs are too high relative to the
gains of transacting, no voluntary transactions will take placeand as a consequence, legal entitlements will not gravitate to
higher-value users through market transactions.34 As an illustration, consider the following example. Assume that Abbie, a PhD
student, wishes to quote a short paragraph from a foreign book in
her dissertation. Assume further that Abbie is willing to pay $12
for the right to quote from the book. Assume as well that the author's asking price is $10. Although at first blush it may appear
that the conditions will support a voluntary transaction, a closer
look demonstrates the need for caution. Once we incorporate even
modest transaction costs in the amount of $5 to the calculus, we
can see that the transaction will not occur. Abbie will not agree to

31 See Nigel Parker, Music Business: Infrastructure,Practiceand Law 272 (Sweet &
Maxwell 2004); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creationand Commercial Value: Copyright Protection
of Works of Information, 90 Colum L Rev 1865, 1869 (1990) ("Moreover, to the extent that
the worth of the work lies in the information, rather than in the form[,] ...modern copyright's emphasis on personality-manifesting characteristics fails to secure the commercial
value of these kinds of endeavors, even though the demand for productions such as directories ... is ever increasing.").
32 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15 (1960).
33 Id.
34 Id at 15-16.
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pay $15 ($10 in price plus $5 in transaction costs) to obtain a use
permit that is worth only $12 to her. Doing so would represent a
net loss of $3 to Abbie. In a world without fair use, therefore, Abbie
will abstain from using the paragraph and forgo a potential gain
of $2.
Building on this insight, Gordon suggested that fair use may
be used to benefit users without (unduly) harming authors when
transaction costs prevent voluntary exchanges from taking
place35 Gordon showed that allowing fair use in cases like Abbie's
would lead to a superior outcome. Considering Abbie a fair user
permits her to use the paragraph for free, creating a net societal
gain. If the author's asking price actually reflects a cost to the
author (in the form of dilution of the copyrighted work, for example), society is better off by $2 as a result of the fair use. In the
more likely case, in which the author faces little or no marginal
cost as a result of Abbie's use, allowing Abbie the use without permission creates a net societal gain of $12 with all of the gain going
to Abbie, yet not leaving the author worse off.
Gordon proposed three cumulative conditions that must be
present for fair use to be recognized in her market-failure theory.
First, transaction costs must bar voluntary exchanges between
copyright owners and users. Second, the use for which fair use
status is sought must promote the public interest. And third, allowing the contested use to continue under the rubric of fair use
must not significantly diminish the author's incentives to produce
new works.36
Notwithstanding the elegance and analytical prowess of the
market-failure theory of fair use, it suffers from several problems.
First, as one of us has pointed out, the usefulness of the marketfailure theory as a judicial tool is largely undermined by the fact
that it relies on information that is nonobservable and nonverifiable by the courts. 37 To use the proposed transaction cost framework to evaluate fair use claims, courts must know the value a
user ascribes to a certain use-but this datum is private information that is known only to the user and may not be easily ascertained by the court. In litigation, any user who availed herself

35 Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1626 (cited in note 5) ("When severe market failure is
present, injury to the copyright owner may not follow from infringement.").
36 Id at 1626-27.
37 Gideon Parchomovsky, FairUse, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 Legal Theory
347, 357-61 (1997).
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of a work without permission could argue that her use was of minimal value and that an agreement between the parties would
therefore not have been feasible in light of the transaction costs.
Second, and no less significantly, the market-failure theory
of fair use portrays fair use as an exception to the general rule
that all use rights should reside with copyright owners. Indeed,
in later writings, Gordon herself addressed this problem with
the market-failure theory.38 Elaborating on this point, Professor
Raymond Ku wrote: "Under [the market-failure] approach, fair use
is an exception to the otherwise exclusive rights of copyright justified
by the presence of market barriers such as high transaction costs,
externalities, non-monetizable benefits, or anti-dissemination motives."39 However, as we show in the next Section, fair use is not
understood by courts as an anomaly or an exception. It is seen as
central to the structure of copyright law. The market-failure theory
is thus problematic as a descriptive theory of the law.
Furthermore, as many commentators have pointed out, the
actual amount of transaction costs associated with many transfers of rights changes over time. 40 An important factor that depresses transaction costs is technology. The ascent of the Internet, in particular, makes it possible for copyright holders to
communicate to the public at large (by means of a website posting,
for instance) elaborate menus of prices for various uses of their
expressive goods and thereby to obviate the need for extensive negotiations concerning the use of intellectual goods.41 This phenomenon was noted, for example, by Professor Robert Merges, who

38 See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon and Daniel Bahls, The Public's Right to Fair
Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the 'Tared Use" Fallacy, 2007 Utah L Rev 619, 65154 (addressing the "need [for] a comprehensive definition of the public's rights in the realm
of expression" in the doctrine of fair use); Gordon, 50 J Copyright Society USA at 151-54
(cited in note 7) (describing the claim in earlier work that "fair use should generally be
denied if recognizing the defense would cause substantial injury to the copyright owner"
as "overbroad"); Gordon, 82 BU L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 7) (asserting that her original
use of the term "market failure" was overly narrow and should be more expansive).
39 Ku, 18 Berkeley Tech L J at 542 (cited in note 27), citing Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev
at 1627-35 (cited in note 5).
40 Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the BroadcastFlag:Mechanisms of Consentand
Refusal and the Propertizationof Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 281, 295 (2003) ("As transaction costs drop through a combination of institutional arrangements such as the Copyright Clearance Center, and as the internet creates a ubiquitous structure for microtransactions-microconsents with micropayments-fair use might cease to play a meaningful role.'); Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va L
Rev 1483, 1499-1500 (2007) ("[T]ransaction costs are not static.").
41 Parchomovsky and Goldman, 93 Va L Rev at 1499-1500 (cited in note 40) ('The
rise of the Internet and the advent of digital platforms, together with the development of
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questioned the need for limitations on intellectual property rights
in an online world without "friction."41 Taking this point to its logical extreme, Professor Tom Bell argued in a provocative article
that, in the Internet age, "fair use" should be replaced with "fared
use," suggesting that no unauthorized uses of intellectual works
should be free any more. 43 Indeed, any theory of fair use that is
based solely on market failure due to transaction costs necessarily
suggests an ever-diminishing fair use doctrine in an age in which
many kinds of transaction costs continue to decline. Gordon's own
discomfort with this conclusion in later writings 44 demonstrates
that she, like others, believes that there is more to fair use than
simply a strategy for dealing with the market failures created by
transaction costs.
It should be noted that technology does not eliminate all relevant transaction costs. In support of Gordon's theory, Professors
Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi have pointed out that even
with declining transaction costs, the fair use doctrine still plays
an important role under the market-failure theory in situations
involving transactions with multiple rights holders.45 In such settings, each right holder may strategically hold out and deny an
aspiring user the power to use her work in the hope of extracting
the full value of the user's project. Fair use mitigates this problem
by setting a cap on the ability of rights holders to withhold consent strategically.46 While Depoorter and Parisi's point is both elegant and well-taken, it potentially limits the usefulness of the
market-failure theory to only cases in which a user must clear
multiple rights and has no other alternatives.
Finally, as Professor Matthew Sag points out, fair use is highly
important in the context of promotion of "copy-reliant" technological innovations. When analyzing the impact of transaction costs on

copyright clearance agencies, have reduced many of the transaction costs that previously
stood as barriers to cost-effective bargaining.") (citation omitted).
42 Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech L J 115, 130, 136 (1997).
43 Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright'sFair Use Doctrine, 76 NC L Rev 557, 579-600 (1998).
44 Gordon and Bahls, 2007 Utah L Rev at 619-24 (cited in note 38).
45 Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection:A Price
Theory Explanation,21 Intl Rev L & Econ 453, 458-62 (2002).
46 Id at 463-64 ("The emergence of a 'click and pay' economy... does not necessarily
eliminate the strategic pricing of copyright licenses. Whenever anticommons costs are serious enough to undermine the viability of the transaction, fair-use doctrines become a
valuable tool for mitigating the resulting deadweight losses.").
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such innovations, it is immaterial that the transaction costs associated with the making of individual copies are considerably lowered because of technological progress. In such instances, we need
to factor in "the total volume of transaction costs faced by copyreliant technologies," not "the costs attending any one transaction."47 Moreover, such technologies "typically rely on ... default
4
rules and ... opt-out mechanisms to reduce transaction costs," 8
these default rules in turn depending on the fair use doctrine for
their legal validity or acceptance as industry practice.
It is noteworthy that Gordon has often pointed out that her
earlier work was misunderstood. 49 In a later article written with
Daniel Bahls, the authors explained that market failure resulting
from relatively high transaction costs constitutes a prima facie
reason to recognize fair use, but they by no means exhausted all
the cases in which fair use ought to be considered. Rather, fair
use should also be available in cases of
patterns of creative production that are not consistent with
bureaucratic behaviors; anticommons, hold-out and bilateral
monopoly problems; distributional inequities; positive externalities; use of another's work not as expression but as a fact;
use of another's expression as a means to access the public
domain; and critical, nonmonetizable and/or "priceless" uses
of copyrighted works. 50
Gordon's expanded framework addresses many of the problems that inhere in the market-failure model, but it does so at the
cost of a coherent account that is guided by a single principle. We
view the clarification she offered in her article with Bahls as an
invitation to supplement the market-failure theory of fair use
with a broader theoretical conceptualization that would move the
discussion in the direction Gordon and Bahls pointed out. It is
precisely this call that we answer in the next Part.

47 Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw U L Rev 1607,
1664 (2009).
48 Id at 1666.
49 See Gordon, 50 J Copyright Society USA at 150 (cited in note 7) (asserting that
her "1982 article has been often misapplied, by both courts and commentators"); Gordon
and Bahls, 2007 Utah L Rev at 623-24 (cited in note 38) (clarifying that her original
market-failure theory "never purported to displace the other justifications for fair use,"
but has been used by commentators to suggest that transaction costs are "the sole basis
for fair use").
50 Gordon and Bahls, 2007 Utah L Rev at 635 (cited in note 38).
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Recent Trends in Fair Use Case Law

One of the many strengths of Gordon's article when it was
published was the fit between the market-failure theory and the
case law as it existed at the time. While judges did not expressly
refer to market failure in fair use decisions, Gordon's theory had
strong explanatory power. The case that Gordon used as the primary illustration of her theory was Universal City Studios, Inc v
Sony Corp of America.51 The legal issue was whether Sony, the
manufacturer and distributor of Betamax, the first videocassette
recorder (VCR), was secondarily liable for copyright infringement
by VCR consumers. In particular, the question was whether Sony
should be held to have contributed to the unauthorized recording
of copyrighted television programs by home users of its technology. 52 Gordon wrote in opposition to the decision of the Ninth Circuit to hold Sony liable for its contribution to consumer infringements.5 3 Gordon argued that Sony should not be found liable
because the home uses of the VCR should be seen as fair uses due
54
to market failure.
Following the publication of Gordon's article, the Supreme
Court in Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc 5 reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding, declaring that Sony did not secondarily infringe. In holding for Sony, the Supreme Court ruled,
inter alia, that the practice of recording programs for later viewing-a practice it labeled "time shifting'"-was fair use. 56 The Supreme Court's decision vindicated Gordon's framework of analysis.
After all, it is unrealistic to expect technology providers, such as
Sony, to secure permission prior to putting their technology on the
market from the thousands upon thousands of owners of rights in
the numerous copyrighted television works. The large number of
rights holders involved makes reliance on voluntary transactions
impractical. Not only would the large number of rights holders require Sony to expend considerable resources on identifying the relevant counterparties and carrying out negotiations with them, but

51 659 F2d 963 (9th Cir 1981). Gordon's article was written in the interim between
this decision and Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417 (1984).
The article focused, naturally, on the Ninth Circuit's decision.
52 Sony, 464 US at 420.
53 See Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1652-57 (cited in note 5).
54 See id at 1655-57.
55 464 US 417 (1984).
56 Id at 455-56.
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it would also mean that each of the counterparties could strategically hold Sony up by refusing to tender permission in the hope of
extracting an especially high payment from Sony.
Sony, it turned out, was the high-water mark for the marketfailure theory. Recent years have seen the case law moving away
from the market-failure theory. First, in Campbell v Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc,57 the Supreme Court had to decide whether an unauthorized rap version of the song "Oh, Pretty Woman" came under
the auspices of fair use.58 In a pathbreaking decision, the Court
ruled that it did, explaining that the rap version may be reasonably perceived as a parody of the original.59 As importantly, in a
sharp deviation from prior decisions, the Court elevated transformativeness above all other fair use factors.60 Following
Campbell, recent fair use decisions appear to focus on the transformativeness of the defendants' works, not transaction costs,
as the key factor in fair use cases. 61 This trend is especially strong
in the Second Circuit and can be seen in that court's decisions in
Blanch v Koons62 and Cariou v Prince.63 In Blanch, the Second
Circuit was required to decide whether the defendant's painting,
which incorporated the plaintiff's photograph without her permission, qualified as fair use. 64 The court ruled that it was fair use,
even though the defendant's work was commercial and did not

510 US 569 (1994).
Id at 571-72.
59 Id at 581-83.
60 Id at 579 ("[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.").
61 See Kathleen K Olson, The Future of Fair Use, 19 Communication L & Pol 417,
420-21 (2014) (highlighting the importance of transformativeness in court decisions postCampbell); Sag, 73 Ohio St L J at 76-77 (cited in note 8) (concluding, based on empirical
studies of court decisions, that although transformativeness is "not the 'alpha and omega'
of fair use, it is nevertheless a significant core component of fair use); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L Rev 715, 736 (2011) (finding that,
after 2005, courts' use of the fair use doctrine is "overwhelmingly dominated" by transformativeness); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L J 535, 550-51 (2004) (tracing the rising
importance of transformativeness in fair use back to 1990); Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding
Fair Use: The "Transformative" Use Doctrineafter Campbell, 7 Communication L & Pol 1,
2 (2002) (analyzing the history of transformativeness and arguing that courts' increasing
reliance on it overprotects copyright holders). Transformativeness may sometimes overlap
with high transaction costs, but as a practical and analytical matter, there is no necessary
correlation between the two benchmarks.
62 467 F3d 244 (2d Cir 2006).
63 714 F3d 694 (2d Cir 2013).
64 Blanch, 467 F3d at 246.
57

58
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parody the plaintiffs work.65 In this case, there were only two parties involved and no market failure seemed to have been present.
The court, however, did not focus on these factors. Rather, it concluded that in its opinion "copyright law's goal of 'promoting the
Progress of Science and useful Arts'... would be better served by
allowing Koons's use of 'Silk Sandals' than by preventing it."66
The Second Circuit's decision in Cariou was even more extreme. In that case, the defendant, Richard Prince, was an "appropriation artist" who lifted many of the plaintiffs photographs
of the Rastafarian people of Jamaica and transformed them into
his own artistic style by, "among other things, painting 'lozenges'
over their subjects' facial features and using only portions of some
of the images.67 Prince did not even attempt to negotiate a license
from Patrick Cariou before using the images.68 Worse yet, Prince
did not bother to offer a justification for his actions. When asked
whether he intended his adaptations to be transformative, he answered that "he '[didn't] really have a message' and that "he was
not 'trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new message."''69 Nonetheless, the court explained that
[w]hat is critical is how the work in question appears to the
reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say
about a particular piece or body of work. Prince's work could
be transformative even without commenting on Cariou's
work or on culture, and even without Prince's stated inten70
tion to do so.
The court proceeded to find fair use with respect to twentyfive of Prince's works that used Cariou's images.71 From a pure
market-failure perspective, there was little reason to find fair use.
The defendant in this case simply bypassed the market, notwithstanding the fact that the transaction costs in this case seemed
very low relative to the value of the uses. Indeed, with respect to
the five images whose use was not ruled fair by the Second Circuit, the parties settled.72

Id at 254-55.
Id at 259, quoting US Const Art I, § 8, cl8.
67 Cariou, 714 F3d at 699.
68 See id.
69 Id at 707.
70 Id.
71 Cariou, 714 F3d at 712.
72 Brian Boucher, Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince Is Settled (Art in
America, Mar 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/B8LX-5K8Q.
65

66
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No less importantly, in two recent decisions, Eldred v Ashcroft7n
and Golan v Holder,74 the Supreme Court conceptualized fair use
not as an anomaly or an exception, but as an intrinsic and indispensable part of the design of the constitutional copyright system.
Eldred involved a facial challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act, 75 in which Congress extended the term of
protection by twenty additional years. 76 The legislation offered the
extension not only prospectively to works that were yet to be created, but also retroactively to works that had already come into
existence under the previous, shorter protection term. 77 A group
of publishers whose business model was predicated on public domain materials argued that the extension was unconstitutional
because it exceeded Congress's power under both the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment.78 The Court ultimately rejected
the challenge and approved the extension, explaining that the extension came under the aegis of the Copyright Clause and that it
did not violate the First Amendment. 79 In this vein, the Court
stated that "copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations." 0 Among those accommodations, the Court listed
the idea-expression dichotomy, under which copyright protection
extends to original expression but is withheld from the ideas underlying it, as well as the fair use doctrine, which "affords consid'
erable 'latitude for scholarship and comment."' 81
The Court's language in Golan is even more instructive. In
Golan, the lead petitioner, a conductor and music professor, challenged the United States' implementation of § 514 of the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act, now found in § 104A of the Copyright
Act.82 Section 104A reinstates copyright protection for multiple
foreign works that had fallen into the public domain for failing to
comply with various formalities8 3 Lawrence Golan argued that
the legislation violated his free speech rights by impoverishing
537 US 186 (2003).
74 132 S Ct 873 (2012).
75 Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (1998), codified as amended at 17 USC §§ 108,
203, 301-04.
76 Eldred, 537 US at 193.
77 Id at 195-96.
78 Id at 193.
79 Id at 221-22.
80 Eldred,537 US at 219, citing Harper& Row, Publishers,Inc v Nation Enterprises,
471 US 539, 560 (1985).
81 Eldred, 537 US at 219-20, quoting Harper& Row, 471 US at 560.
82
Golan, 132 S Ct at 878.
83 17 USC § 104A(a)(1), (h)(6).
73
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the public domain.84 Once again, the Supreme Court dismissed
the challenge. Reiterating the reasoning in Eldred, the Court
stated that the "traditional contours" of the copyright system are
delineated by the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use. 85 The
Court proceeded to explain that legislative changes limiting the
availability of copyrighted works to the public will pass judicial
muster as long as they do not affect the idea-expression dichotomy
or curtail fair use. 86 As Professor Neil Netanel has pointed out,
one clear implication of the Supreme Court's ruling is that the
First Amendment forbids legislation that would significantly restrict fair use. 87
II. A NEW THEORY OF FAIR USE
In this Part, we present our alternative approach to the fair
use doctrine. We argue that our approach better fits both the economic imperatives of copyright law and the recent case law on the
subject.
Perhaps the easiest way to understand our approach is by
contrasting it to the market-failure approach. In some ways, ours
is the polar opposite of the market-failure approach. The marketfailure theory assumes that all rights associated with copyrighted
works should be presumed to lie with the owner of the copyright.
In this view, fair use is an exception that allows transfers of those
rights to users on a transaction-by-transaction basis, and only
when a particular transaction is likely to be blocked by market
failure.88
Our theory, by contrast, assumes that copyright law consciously allocates to users many privileged uses, irrespective of the
desires of the author. The law divides the rights associated with
copyrighted works between author and public. We assume that
certain privileges associated with copyrighted works should be
presumed to lie with the general public and that those privileges
should be denied only in extreme cases. As we show, our proposed
version of the doctrine would have courts recognize a contested
use as "fair" whenever two conditions are met: First, the use is

84

Golan, 132 S Ct at 891.

85

Id at 890.

See id at 890-91.
Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraintson Copyright after Golan
v. Holder, 60 UCLA L Rev 1082, 1128 (2013).
88 See Part I.A.
86
87
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within the scope of several presumptively public uses, such as political speech or research. These presumptively public uses can be
identified by category and are characterized by the creation of significant value for follow-on users. Second, granting the use the
status of "fair use"-or, more precisely, granting the status of fair
use to the class of uses that would be encompassed both by the
user's proposed fair use and by similar uses by similarly situated
users-would not entirely eliminate the incentive to create this
particular work. The second condition largely overlaps with one
of the elements of Professor Gordon's proposal,89 with some differences that we highlight below. 90 We acknowledge that it also
shares one of the imperfections of the similar element in Gordon's
account, namely, that the determination will not be mathematical-though, as we show,91 it should produce clearer results than
Gordon's proposal. In particular, we show that our approach has
the advantage of focusing on the character of the use rather than
the character of the user. Thus, we are able to avoid individualized assessments of users in every fair use case.
At the outset, however, we must state that while our analysis
differs in significant respects from Gordon's original marketfailure theory, doctrinally our proposal should be seen as a cumulative addition to market-failure analysis, rather than a repudiation of it. While our theory of fair use leads us to embrace a
new doctrine for protecting uses that would not be protected under the market-failure theory, our theory is not incompatible with
the idea that uses that would be subject to market failure due to
relatively high transaction costs should be treated as fair uses in
addition to the other uses that we identify as presumptively fair
uses. Likewise, we emphasize that our goal in using the marketfailure theory as a backdrop against which we portray our theory
is not to discredit Gordon's many invaluable contributions to the
theory of fair use. On the contrary, it is due to the significance of
her illuminating and multifaceted scholarship in this area that
her theories provide the starting point for our discussion.92
89 Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1618-19 (cited in note 5). Gordon terms this the "substantial injury hurdle" required to be overcome in cases of "intermediate market failure." Id.
90 See Part III.C.1.
91 See Part III.C.2.
92 Indeed, in one important sense, our proposal is very close to Gordon's. Specifically,
as we show, our proposal, like Gordon's, is-at least in some cases-focused on transaction
costs. However, our treatment of the transaction cost issue is very different from Gordon's.
In our view, one of the central concerns of the fair use doctrine is granting users the rights
to carry out uses that would otherwise be attended by high transaction costs. However,
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The Economics of Copyright

The point of departure for our theory of fair use is an incentivesbased or economic understanding of copyright. There is little doubt
that the foundations of American copyright law, as found in the
Constitution, are economically based and aimed at incentivizing
authorship.93 The Copyright Clause tells us that Congress should
grant exclusive rights in 'Writings" to "Authors" in order to "promote the Progress of Science." 94 Copyright law aims to incentivize
the creation of expressive works by granting authors exclusive
rights in their creations--enough rights to make creation pecuniarily worthwhile for authors while not unduly removing expressions from the public domain.95
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner's classic
article on the economics of copyright law explains the incentive
structure created by copyright law.96 There are two outstanding
features of expressions that must be taken into account by lawmakers in establishing the law of copyright. First, expressions,
like other items that are encompassed within the world of intellectual property, have features of what the economic literature
calls "public goods." 97 This means that the market alone will not
the reason for this is not that we are concerned that the high transaction costs might block
otherwise-valuable transactions. Rather, we worry that the transaction costs themselves
are costs to society that can sometimes be avoided. Simply put, when the fair use doctrine
allocates a use to a user who can derive benefit from the expression, the doctrine saves the
user and the author the cost of negotiating a license and thereby benefits society. Viewed
in this way, transaction costs are potentially enough to justify fair use any time they are
above zero (or at least above the cost of administering the doctrine of fair use), even if they
are not so high as to bar voluntary transactions.
93 See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information,
and Law, 76 NYU L Rev 23, 59-60 (2001) ("The Supreme Court has held consistently and
unanimously that American law explicitly treats intellectual property rights in utilitarian
terms."); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the ConstitutionalFoundations of the Public Domain, 66 L & Contemp Probs 173, 175-77 (Winter/Spring 2003).
94 US Const Art I,§ 8,cl 8.
95 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand L Rev 1799, 1801 (2000)
("Copyright law conceives and promotes progress in two distinct but related ways: First,
it seeks to increase both the quantity and quality of creative output. Second, it seeks to
broaden public access to creative works."); S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying,
and Price Discrimination,8 Rsrch L & Econ 181, 184-86 (1986); Ian E.Novos and Michael
Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection:An Analytic Approach, 92 J Polit
Econ 236, 244 (1984).
96 See generally Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud 325 (cited in note 16).
97
Depoorter and Parisi, 21 Intl Rev L & Econ at 454 n 4 (cited in note 45); Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex L Rev 989,
994-96 (1997); Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 326 (cited in note 16); William W.
Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv L Rev 1659, 1700-05 (1988);
Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1610-11 (cited in note 5); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case

2016]

The Dual-GrantTheory of Fair Use

1073

produce the goods and that some legal incentives are necessary to
prompt the market to produce them. Second, the legal incentives
created by copyright law are themselves potentially market distorting.98 Like all intellectual property law, copyright law can create monopolies or other anticompetitive features9s Copyright law
thus eternally seeks to balance the beneficial and harmful aspects
of the rights that it grants to authors.100 Unfortunately, the very
same tools used by lawmakers to create and encourage copyright
markets are the ones that distort those markets.
There is a vast literature on public goods and the reasons why
ordinary markets will not produce them. Public goods are items
whose consumption is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable-that is,
all users can use the items without diminishing the ability of others to consume them, and there is no way to block potential users
from consuming the items.1o1 Pure public goods cannot be sold in
the market effectively and therefore cannot bring returns to their
producers. Consequently, there is no reason a private producer
will ever decide to manufacture public goods.102 Expressions, or
more generally information, are in many ways the quintessential

for Copyright:A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84
Harv L Rev 281, 281 n 4 (1970).
98
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace Rights without Laws?, 73 Chi
Kent L Rev 1155, 1171 (1998); Sterk, 94 Mich L Rev at 1204-05 (cited in note 12). See also
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 NYU L Rev 212, 227-28
(2004); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L Rev 121, 133-34 (1999);
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's DemocraticPrinciplesin the Global Arena,
51 Vand L Rev 217, 248-49 (1998); Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 350-51 (cited
in note 16).
99 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex L
Rev 1031, 1058-59 (2005); Burk, 21 Cardozo L Rev at 133 (cited in note 98); Elkin-Koren,
73 Chi Kent L Rev at 1171 (cited in note 98); Sterk, 94 Mich L Rev at 1205 (cited in note 12).
100 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan L Rev 1343, 1344 (1989). See also
Netanel, 51 Vand L Rev at 248-49 (cited in note 98) ("The incentive rationale posits, however, that such a 'tax on readers' is a necessary evil because, without it, audiences would
have little creative expression to choose from in the first place.").
101 David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 9
Nw J Tech & Intel Prop 533, 537-38 (2011); R.A. Musgrave, Provisionfor Social Goods, in
J. Margolis and H. Guitton, eds, Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Productionand
Consumption and Their Relations to the Private Sectors 124, 126-29 (Macmillan 1969).
See also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A MisunderstoodRelation, 155 U Pa L Rev 635, 644-46 (2007).
102 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the
Provision of Public Goods, 108 Yale L J 377, 380-90 (1998) (discussing multiple theories
explaining why private markets underproduce public goods).
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public goods. 103 Information can be consumed by any number of
people, and the knowledge of one does not in any way diminish
the knowledge of another. In the ordinary course of events, once
information is revealed, producers have no practical ability to
block further transmission of the information to others. While
there are various nonpecuniary benefits that a producer may get
from creating expressions or information, the absence of markets
would mean that in a world without intellectual property rights,
fewer expressions would be created because there would be fewer
incentives to create such expressions.
Copyright law supplies the missing incentives by giving creators a package of exclusive legal rights in expressions for an extended period of time. The legal protection makes the expressions
excludable. That is, once copyright law exists, the producer can
police the use of the expressions and prevent nonpaying users
from consuming the good.104 Legal protection thus significantly
expands the possibilities for markets in expressions and thereby
incentivizes creativity.
However, the market created by the legal protection is itself
a distorted market. During the period of exclusive protection, the
copyright owner enjoys monopoly rights over the expression.105
Because expressions often do not have perfect substitutes, the
market for expressions may often display the characteristic flaws
of monopolistic markets-excessively high prices and subcompetitive supply of the good.106 Legal protections for copyright, in other
words, impose a cost on society at the same time as they produce
the societal benefit of incentivizing creation. As a result, noted
Landes and Posner, while some copyright protection is beneficial
for society, "beyond some level copyright protection may actually
be counterproductive."'107 Indeed, since all copyrighted expressions invariably rely to some degree on earlier works, excessive
copyright protection can directly restrict the cost and availability

103

See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information without Intellectual Property,91

Tex L Rev 227, 235-36 (2012); Peter S. Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1473, 1476-79 (Elsevier 2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,71 U Chi L Rev 129, 129 (2004); Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at
1610-11 (cited in note 5).
104 17 USC § 106.
105 See 17 USC § 106.
106 See Lemley, 83 Tex L Rev at 1058-60 (cited in note 99).
107 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 16).

2016]

The Dual-GrantTheory of Fair Use

1075

of future copyrighted works.108 Copyright law must therefore always seek to find the balance that maximizes the societal benefit
of incentivizing creation net the cost of restricting the availability
of protected expressions. Here, Landes and Posner, like the scholars that have followed them, frankly acknowledge that they have
no formula for determining the precise amount and type of protection that would be optimal.109
B.

The Allocation of Rights

The exclusive rights granted to an author are significant and
designed to give the author ample opportunity for pecuniary benefit. In general, copyright law specifies that, for a fixed period of
time,110 only the author is permitted to copy, adapt, display, perform, or distribute a copyrighted work.111 This means that during
this period, most potential users (other than those enjoying the
benefit of a legal exemption or license)112 must receive permission
from the author. The author is expected to sell such permission
and thereby realize the pecuniary rewards of creation.
As we have written elsewhere, it is highly doubtful that the
entire package of exclusive rights is necessary to incentivize the
amount of creation of expressive works we see today.113 For most
copyrighted works, the authors are inframarginal; they would
have created the works even if they had been granted only a much
smaller selection of rights. More broadly, the vast expansion of
authors' rights in recent decades has led to widespread criticism
that compensation of all authors is excessive.114
How can lawmakers trim the package of authors' rights to
give only enough rights to incentivize creation? There are many
ways to adjust the optimal balance of copyright rights so as to
attempt to maximize social benefits. The most straightforward-

108

Id.

109 See id at 361 ("Whether the law has struck the right balance is not readily

determinable.").
110 17 USC § 302.
111 17 USC § 106.
112 See, for example, 17 USC § 110.
113 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent,
113 Mich L Rev 231, 276-77 (2014) (asserting that a voluntarily tailored copyright regime
would "preserv[e] the incentives to produce intangible assets while reducing the cost to
society"). See also Bracha and Syed, 92 Tex L Rev at 1858-59 (cited in note 14) (explaining
how increased copyright protection can block access to some works that would have been
created even without the additional incentive).
114 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 113 Mich L Rev at 241-42 (cited in note 113).
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but far from the best-means of adjusting is to change the temporal margins of protective terms or rights. For instance, lawmakers can shorten or lengthen the term of protection for copyrighted
15
works from its current seventy years plus the life of the author
to fifty or ninety years plus the life of the author. Term adjustments straightforwardly subtract or add a certain quantum of incentives (the expected pecuniary benefits to be realized by the author during that future period of time) at the same time as they
expand or restrict the public's ability to use the work by changing
the point in time when the work will enter the public domain. Yet,
while it is relatively easy for the state to administer adjustments
of the term of protection, such term adjustments are blunt instruments. During the legal term of protection, whatever it might be,
authors enjoy the usual monopoly protection for their expressions, meaning that even if the term adjustments are perfectly
tailored to provide socially desired incentives for creation, those
incentives might be provided at a higher social cost than necessary. The law could have achieved the same level of incentives by
granting fewer rights for a longer period of time. Or it could have
given the same rights for a longer period of time, but expanded
the number of privileged uses.
Our approach to the fair use doctrine reads the Copyright Act
as aiming to adjust the amount of incentives granted to authors
by setting aside for the public a number of privileged uses. We
argue that the fair use doctrine seeks to balance copyright
through a conscious division of legal entitlements between authors and users. In our theory, instead of dividing the rights along
the axis of time or by the type of exclusive activity granted to the
author (reproduction, adaptation, distribution, etc.), the fair use
doctrine is intended to divide legal protections between author
and public according to the nature of the intended use. The purpose in allocating entitlements this way is to allocate to the public
certain privileged uses that are likely to be of significant public
value, while reserving for authors sufficient valuable rights to
maintain incentives to create.
In allocating certain privileges to the nonowner users, fair
use doctrine consciously departs from the usual practice in property law, and it is important to explain why. Specifically, we must
show why it would not be better to just give the copyright owner

115

17 USC § 302(a).
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all the rights and allow her to sell to consumers the uses that they
want.
To understand the best way to divide these legal protections,
it is worth taking a second look at the problem of allocating property rights. Consider a world in which lawmakers know the optimal users of all uses of assets, the appetite for such uses is fixed
and stable over time, and allocation among users is costless. In
this idealized world, the optimal approach would be to allocate
directly to each potential user the use right in the assets, even if
this meant dividing up the use rights for a single asset among
hundreds of users. The allocation would be free, final, and optimal. High-value users would have all the use rights they needed
in assets. Society would avoid the costs of providing mechanisms
for efficient allocation. While subsequent transactions in the asset
might well be difficult and costly, they would also be unnecessary
because the high-value user of each use would already own what
she needs.
Of course, the imaginary world of perfect initial allocations
does not exist. Appetites for uses are not fixed and stable, and
even if they were, information about appetites for uses is not
freely available. Initial allocations are expensive. It is generally
impossible for a central planner to identify and measure tastes
anywhere near as efficiently as a marketplace can. In the real
world, it is difficult to find the circumstances in which a central
planner dividing uses among many claimants produces net societal gain.116
However, the point made by the example is an important one:
a good initial allocation is of great social benefit. If the allocation
is done well, it can increase societal welfare by reducing the need
to transfer rights, thereby saving transaction costs. Indeed, a
good initial allocation can be of such high social benefit in some
cases that it can compensate for subsequent societal losses created by legal regimes that make transactions more difficult (and
by the attendant higher cost of those transactions that must take
place).
This observation is doubly true when it comes to copyright.
Because copyright uses are generally nonrivalrous-that is, the
use of the work by one consumer does not in any way diminish
116 See Israel M. Kirzner, Economic Planningand the Knowledge Problem, 4 Cato J
407, 412-14 (1984); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
StructuralApproach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L Rev 1643, 164446(1996).
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the ability of a different consumer to use it-the cost of misallocation is low. Granting a use right to the wrong consumer does
not require a new (and costly) transaction; it simply eats away
from the incentives of the author. Misallocation is not costless.
But it is not nearly as costly as with ordinary property.
Our understanding of the fair use doctrine in copyright law
is informed in large part by the allocative question in light of the
need for limited rights. The optimal grant of copyright rights
would not give the owner all rights to the copyrighted work in
perpetuity. Rather, the optimal grant would give the owner exclusive authority over the work as necessary to incentivize creation.
At the same time, the fair use doctrine necessarily bestows on
consumers of the expression exclusively uses of positive value.
Compare the fair use doctrine, for example, to a rule that curbs
owners' terms of protection by ten years. The term limitation
grants additional privileges to the public, but there may be no audience for such privileges. It may be that there is no market for
using a given work in its 115th year of protection or, for that matter, even in its 15th year. Indeed, the value of most expressive
works disappears long before the protection term runs out. 117 The
fair use doctrine, under any interpretation, applies only to uses
that at least one consumer desires. If there is no actual use, there
can be no fair use. A fair use doctrine allocates directly to users
privileges that they want and value.
In this sense, there is no better way to achieve division of legal protections between the public and the copyright owner than
by granting use privileges via such doctrines as fair use. Such doctrines necessarily grant to the public something valuable and only
something valuable. This point deserves emphasis. In general,
the main societal loss stemming from misallocation of an asset is
underuse of the asset. If the state allocates an asset to a low-value
user and transaction costs are excessive, the asset will likely not
be used by some or all high-value users. In other words, some
high-value uses will never take place. But this cost of misallocation does not appear when the state grants use privileges and uses
are nonrivalrous. In such cases, users will, by necessity, exercise
their use privileges only when the value of the use is positive for
them and for society as a whole. Even misallocated use privileges
will not lead to underuse. By contrast, allocating legal protection

117

Eldred, 537 US at 248 (Breyer dissenting).
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directly to the user is valuable to society, because it saves the
need to transact and the cost that comes with it.
Unfortunately, use allocations are not flawless, even in the
world of copyright. There are two chief pitfalls that use allocations
must avoid to be societally beneficial. First, the use allocation
must leave authors with sufficiently valuable rights. The authors
must retain the right to veto at least some transactions to profit
from the expression. This profit, indeed, is the sine qua non of
copyright law, for it must generate the incentives for authors to
create. Thus, the public use (or fair use) privilege cannot be so
large as to eliminate all profit and thereby destroy the incentives
to create.
Second, adjudicating use divisions is not costless. Use divisions are not easily administered, and judicial resources in resolving disputes over the use privilege may be significant. For a use
allocation to be efficient, the use privilege must not be so difficult
to administer as to dissipate all the ex ante transaction cost savings in ex post judicial administration costs.
In the next Part, we examine how a doctrine of fair use can
achieve a superior allocation of rights without eliminating the incentives to create and without creating excessive judicial administrative costs.

III. A NEW DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE
In this Part, we argue that the best way to implement the
division of legal protections created by the dual-grant theory of
fair use is to allocate uses to ultimate users in discrete categories
that are relatively easy to identify, that do not require excessive
amounts of private information, that provide some identifiable
widespread value across the public (that is not exclusive to the
actual user of the expression), and that are not so great as to cross
the margin at which the author loses incentives to create. Fair
use doctrine is the mechanism by which the law allocates directly
to users those uses with the greatest net societal benefit from direct allocation and removes them from the grant of exclusive
rights to the author.
Drawing on this approach, we present the actual doctrine of
fair use we propose, drawing from the theory we expounded in the
previous Part. We present both an idealized doctrine and a more
realistic one, compare them to existing doctrine, and illustrate
our proposed doctrine with several examples. Focusing on the mechanics of our proposal, we pay particular attention to the way
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uses might be categorized as presumptively fair. We begin by contrasting our proposal with extant fair use doctrine.
A.

The Extant Doctrine of Fair Use

Fair use is one of the most widely litigated and amorphous
doctrines in the lawi1s and has been part of US copyright law at
least since 1841119 (and much longer than that, according to some
scholars120). Its modern form is codified in § 107 of the Copyright
Act. Section 107 does not give clear guidance on when uses of a
copyrighted work should be considered "fair" and therefore legally
permitted without license from the owner. Rather, § 107 gives
courts a list of illustrative purposes of fair use-"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research"-and four factors to consider in determining whether the use is fair: (1) "the purpose and
character of the [allegedly fair] use"; (2) "the nature of the copyrighted work;" (3) "the amount and substantiality of the portion"
of the copyrighted work used by the allegedly fair use; and (4) "the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."121
In a classic article, Judge Pierre Leval highlighted the shortcomings of both the statutory formulation and the cases that implement it:
What is most curious about this doctrine is that neither the
decisions that have applied it for nearly 300 years, nor its
eventual statutory formulation, undertook to define or explain its contours or objectives ....
[They] furnish little guidance on how to recognize fair use. The statute, for example,
directs us to examine the "purpose and character" of the secondary use as well as "the nature of the copyrighted work."
Beyond stating a preference for the critical, educational, and
118 See Nimmer, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 266-67 (cited in note 2) (highlighting the
number of Supreme Court decisions interpreting fair use).
119 See generally, for example, Folsom v Marsh, 9 F Cases 342 (CCD Mass 1841).
120 See William Patry, How to Fix Copyright 215 (Oxford 2011) (tracing the origins of
the fair use doctrine back to the 1710 Statute of Anne in England); Matthew Sag, The
Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 Brooklyn L Rev 1371, 1387-93 (2011) (arguing that the development of fair use "predates Folsom v. Marsh by at least 100 years"); Kylie Pappalardo
and Brian Fitzgerald, Copyright, Fair Use and the Australian Constitution, in Brian
Fitzgerald and John Gilchrist, eds, Copyright Perspectives: Past, Present and Prospect
125, 129-30 (Springer 2015) (tracing the English history of copyright law to 1740 and
noting how the English cases informed the American doctrine of fair use).
121 17 USC § 107.
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nonprofit over the commercial, the statute tells little about
what to look for in the "purpose and character" of the secondary use. It gives no clues at all regarding the significance of
"the nature of" the copyrighted work. Although it instructs
us to be concerned with the quantity and importance of the
materials taken and with the effect of the use on the potential
for copyright profits, it provides no guidance for distinguishing between acceptable and excessive levels. Finally, although leaving open the possibility that other factors may bear
on the question, the statute identifies none.
Curiously, judges generally have neither complained of the
absence of guidance, nor made substantial efforts to fill the
void. Uttering confident conclusions as to whether the particular taking was or was not a fair use, courts have treated the
definition of the doctrine as assumed common ground.
The assumption of common ground is mistaken. Judges do
not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. . .. The
opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning of fair
use. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but
seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual
fact patterns. Justification is sought in notions of fairness,
often more responsive to the concerns of private property
than to the objectives of copyright.122
Case law tends to focus on the four factors in determining
whether a use is fair, but decisions are far from uniform. Recent
years have seen courts paying growing attention to whether the
allegedly fair use is transformative; transformativeness has thus
become a key element in all four factors. 123 However, other features of the cases, such as market analysis, remain important,
making outcomes difficult to predict. 124
One outstanding feature of current case law is the degree to
which the four factors are pliable. Consider, for instance, the
122 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev 1105, 1105-07
(1990) (citations omitted).
123 Sag, 73 Ohio St L J at 76-77 (cited in note 8); Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 605-06
(cited in note 1).
124 See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-OrientedApproach to Fair Use, 45 Wm & Mary
L Rev 1525, 1666 (2004) (describing the unpredictable nature of fair use and calling it "a
lottery argument"). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement,
93 Iowa L Rev 1271, 1284 (2008) (modeling the similar uncertainty surrounding an individual's ex ante determination of whether a particular use of a copyrighted work will qualify
as a fair use); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 167,
192 (2005).
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treatment of the third factor (the amount and substantiality of
the portion of the copyrighted work used by the allegedly fair use).
Some courts have found that using the entirety of the copyrighted
work is no great hindrance to a finding of fair use, 125 while others
have found the use of much smaller amounts of the original work
to be critical to the denial of a finding of fair use. 126 In most cases,
courts analyze the proportion of the original work that has been
used127-but there have been cases in which courts have looked
instead at the proportion of the new, allegedly fair work that was
copied from the original.12s While hard guidelines on proportions
have been suggested 129 and even incorporated in nonbinding

125 See, for example, Swatch Group Management Services Ltd v Bloomberg LP, 756
F3d 73, 90 (2d Cir 2014); Authors Guild, Inc v HathiTrust, 755 F3d 87, 98 (2d Cir 2014)
(holding that copying entire books did not prevent a finding of fair use because it was
necessary to enable full-text searching); A. V v iParadigms,LLC, 562 F3d 630, 642 (4th
Cir 2009) (noting that the use of a work in its entirety was not dispositive of fair use); Bill
GrahamArchives v DorlingKindersley Ltd, 448 F3d 605, 613 (2d Cir 2006); ChicagoBoard
of Educationv Substance, Inc, 354 F3d 624, 629 (7th Cir 2003).
126 See, for example, Ringgold v Black EntertainmentTelevision, Inc, 126 F3d 70, 7577 (2d Cir 1997) (finding that a 26.75-second exposure of the plaintiff's posters on a television show weighed against a finding of fair use); Allen-Myland, Inc v InternationalBusiness Machines Corp, 746 F Supp 520, 534-35 (ED Pa 1990); Iowa State University Research Foundation,Inc v American Broadcasting Companies, Inc, 621 F2d 57, 61-62 (2d
Cir 1980) (holding that a defendant's use of 8 percent of a film in its broadcasts was significant and concluding that a fair use defense was unavailable).
127 See, for example, Arrow Productions,Ltd v Weinstein Co, 44 F Supp 3d 359, 371
(SDNY 2014) (comparing the length of three scenes from a copyrighted movie with the
overall length of the movie); NXIVM Corp v The Ross Institute, 364 F3d 471, 480-81 (2d
Cir 2004) (comparing the amount copied from a copyrighted work with the work's total
length); Wright v Warner Books, Inc, 953 F2d 731, 738-39 (2d Cir 1991) (comparing the
quotations taken from a copyrighted book with the length of the book itself); New EraPublications International,ApS v Carol PublishingGroup, 904 F2d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir 1990).
128 See, for example, Salinger v Random House, Inc, 811 F2d 90, 98-99 (2d Cir 1987)
(noting that copyrighted material appeared on 40 percent of an infringing book's pages);
Harper& Row, Publishers,Inc v Nation Enterprises,471 US 539, 564-66 (1985); Meeropol
v Nizer, 560 F2d 1061, 1070-71 (2d Cir 1977) (finding it significant that copyrighted letters
comprised a substantial portion of promotional materials for an infringing book although
they made up less than 1 percent of the book itself).
129 See Gregory K. Klingsporn, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU)and the Future
of Fair Use Guidelines, 23 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 101, 113 (1999); Kenneth D. Crews, The
Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-UseGuidelines, 62 Ohio St L J 599, 630-31 (2001)
(highlighting the minutely detailed CONFU multimedia guidelines for educational use).
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guidelines,130 many cases suggest that the very idea of hard guidelines is an affront to the nature of fair use. 131
Recent years have seen some refinement of the thesis that
fair use is in doctrinal disarray. In a study of fair use opinions
from the years 1978-2005, Professor Barton Beebe found that judicial applications of the doctrine were surprisingly stable over
time and even displayed some resistance to changes in doctrine
announced by the Supreme Court.132 However, Beebe also found
some manipulation of the four statutory factors, as well as some
variance in the way the factors were interpreted.133 Using these
findings, Professor Pamela Samuelson emphasized the degree to
which extant fair use law is clustered around what she called
"policy-relevant" patterns. 3 4 Essentially, Samuelson argued that
much of the apparent disarray of existing fair use doctrine disappears if we note that courts' approaches to fair use cases depend
almost entirely on the category to which the allegedly "fair" use
belongs. Unfortunately, the picture of policy-relevant categories
is not entirely clean. Samuelson identified a large number of policy categories---"promoting freedom of speech and of expression,
the ongoing progress of authorship, learning, access to information,
130 Parchomovsky and Goldman, 93 Va L Rev at 1505-06 (cited in note 40) (detailing
the Classroom Guidelines that found a place in the House Report accompanying the Copyright Act); Crews, 62 Ohio St L J at 637 (cited in note 129) (contending that the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) guidelines of 1979
had strong legislative authority backing them, more so because they were built on the foundation of the judicial precedent of Williams & Wilkins Co v United States, 487 F2d 1345 (Ct
C1 1973)).
131 See Cambridge University Press v Patton, 769 F3d 1232, 1273 (11th Cir 2014),
quoting Campbell, 510 US at 584 ("[T]o treat the Classroom Guidelines as indicative of
what is allowable would be to create the type of 'hard evidentiary presumption' that the
Supreme Court has cautioned against, because fair use must operate as a 'sensitive balancing of interests."'); Perfect 10, Inc v Amazon.com, Inc, 508 F3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir
2007), quoting Campbell, 510 US at 577 ('We must be flexible in applying a fair use analysis;
it 'is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for case-by-case analysis."'); Basic Books, Inc v Kinko's Graphics Corp, 758 F Supp 1522,
1537 (SDNY 1991) ("We ...refuse to hold that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited
without a fair use analysis.").
132 See Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 621-22 (cited in note 1).
133 See id at 610, 614-15, 622.
134 See Pamela Samuelson, UnbundlingFair Uses, 77 Fordham L Rev 2537, 2541-42
(2009). Samuelson acknowledges her intellectual debt to earlier attempts to divide fair use
into clusters. Id at 2541 n 27, citing Madison, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1645-65 (cited in
note 124), Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Study No 14, Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong, 2d Sess 8-14 (1960), Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 Colum J L & Arts 433,
439-41 (2008), and William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 64-259
(BNA 2d ed 1995).
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truth telling or truth seeking, competition, technological innovation, and privacy and autonomy interests of users"-some originating in the language of § 107 and others originating in case law.13
B.

An Idealized New Doctrine of Fair Use

The pliability surrounding the working of the fair use doctrine necessitates clear earmarking of permitted uses, in line with
our proposal of dual grants. Legislators can implement the dualgrant theory in two ideal ways: author-centered and user-centered.
Unfortunately, neither of these ideal approaches is workable in reality, leaving legislators to choose an imperfect compromise.
An author-centered approach would explicitly key fair use to
the quantity and quality of the grants of rights to authors. Any
expansion of author rights would automatically lead to an expansion of fair use. If, for instance, Congress were to grant an additional twenty years of copyright protection to owners-as it did in
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act136-courts would
automatically expand fair use to recapture uses for the public and
to restore the balance of the dual grant. The scope of fair use
would move up and down in lockstep with changes in the grant of
rights to authors.
A user-centered approach, by contrast, would grant large
chunks of presumably fair uses directly to the public. These
grants of uses and changes in the scope of fair use would, in turn,
affect the rights of authors. An expansion of fair use would expand
authors' rights, and a contraction of fair use would shrink authors' rights.
Unfortunately, both ideal approaches suffer from a huge
flaw-they are very expensive to administer. Both ideals demand
constant vigilance. The world of copyright is already in continuous flux due to technological innovations, market developments,
and legal changes. To match user privileges to owner rights (or
vice versa), courts would have to monitor all these changes and
update standards on a regular basis.
The law of copyright thus adopts a compromise. Both user
privileges and author rights are defined with respect to uses rather than by comparison with one another. The rights granted to
authors are defined in terms of specific acts (such as copying or

135 Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at 2541-42 (cited in note 134).

136 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102, 112 Stat at 2827-28.
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performing) for specified times. The privileges granted to users
are defined more vaguely, though, we argue, no less broadly.
Although user privileges and author rights are defined separately by statute, 137 their interrelationship ought to be borne in
mind by courts. Specifically, courts must be sensitive to the
breadth of author rights when they define uses as fair or not. An
expansion in author rights should be accompanied by a corresponding judicial openness to new claims of fair use.
C.

A Proposed New Doctrine of Fair Use

Since it is impracticable to create a fair use standard that is
precisely matched to author rights, we propose a simplified set of
fair use rules that make fair use easier to apply and more oriented
toward achieving allocative efficiency, even if the doctrine is incapable of precisely measuring the set of rights necessary for author
incentives. These fair use rules could be applied by judges within
the existing fair use framework, given its pliability.
1. Two steps and four factors.
Our proposed doctrine cuts through the confusion by refocusing courts on two basic questions. Under our proposal, courts
would evaluate fair use claims through a two-step process. In the
first step, the fair use claimant (the alleged infringer) would establish a prima facie right to use the fair use defense by showing
that the use falls within certain privileged categories-political
speech, truth seeking, or any other category of uses that produces
widespread nonpecuniary follow-on benefits for nonusers. In the
second step, the owner of the copyright would have the opportunity to rebut the fair use defense by showing that granting the
fair use claim in this and similar cases would have the effect of
denying the minimal incentives necessary for creation of this
work.
Importantly, our proposal would easily accommodate the four
statutory factors that § 107 of the Copyright Act indicates should
guide courts in their decisions. In our proposed doctrine, two of
the factors would be examined to determine whether the use was
prima facie privileged, while the other two would help the court
figure out whether recognizing the use as fair would eliminate the
incentives for creation.
137 See 17 USC § 107 (codifying users' fair use rights); 17 USC § 106 (identifying copyrights owners' exclusive rights).
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Part one of a court's fair use determination, in our proposed
doctrine, would require the court to decide whether the use is
within a privileged category by evaluating the purpose and character of the allegedly fair use (factor one). The court would also
have to pay attention to "the amount and substantiality of the
portion"138 of the copyrighted work used by the allegedly fair use
(factor three) to determine whether the claimed use actually
matched reality. Consider, for instance, a decision by the political
campaign of Harry to distribute for free the autobiography of his
opponent Bernice, in order to criticize Bernice's onetime support
for socialism. It is clear that this is a political use, which is a use
that is prima facie privileged in our proposed doctrine. However,
Bernice might convincingly argue that Harry could have achieved
his proposed political use by distributing portions of the autobiography rather than the whole work. A court convinced of the merits of Bernice's claim would determine that Harry had not established the prima facie validity of use, since the distribution of the
entire work could not be reconciled with the privileged purpose.
Part two of a court's fair use determination, in our proposed
doctrine, would involve an assessment of whether recognizing the
proposed use as fair would, in the context of the work, eliminate
sufficient incentives for creation. Naturally, this examination
would have to consider the effect of the proposed fair use "upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"139 (factor four), and the extent to which nonmarket factors might sufficiently motivate the creation of this kind of work (factor two).
However, the court would examine these elements to determine
only whether the proposed fair use is so extreme as to eliminate
the incentives to create the work. In making this determination,
the court would consider not only the particular use engaged in
by the defendant, but also the effect on incentives to create the
work if similar users with similar uses could likewise enjoy the
protection of the fair use doctrine.140
Consider again Harry's use of Bernice's autobiography. A
court would have to examine how Harry's distribution of parts of
Bernice's autobiography, and like distribution by other candidates or political opponents of Bernice, would affect the market
17 USC § 107(3).
139 17 USC § 107(4).
140 If the court failed to consider the effects of similar uses, our doctrine would create
a perverse situation in which the same type of use would be fair for an early user, but not
fair for a later user.
138
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for Bernice's book. However, finding a significant adverse effect
on the market would not constitute sufficient reason to defeat a
claim of fair use. Rather, the court would have to determine that
if all Bernice's opponents were to distribute portions of the autobiography without license, Bernice would lack sufficient incentive
to publish the autobiography in the first place. Here, the nature
of the work would be particularly important, because a court
might readily determine that the incentives for production of a
political autobiography are not primarily pecuniary.
2. Privileged uses.
The key to our proposed fair use doctrine is a list of privileged
uses that are presumptively fair. A court's determination that a
use is presumptively fair greatly increases the likelihood that the
defendant will succeed in a fair use defense; it will not be easy for
a copyright owner to show that recognizing the fair use claim
would suffice to eliminate incentives to create the work.
What types of uses should be recognized as presumptively
fair in our proposed doctrine? As we noted in Part II.B, fair use
doctrine should aim to privilege uses in discrete categories that
are relatively easy to identify and that provide some identifiable,
widespread value across the public that is not exclusive to the actual user of the expression. Our aim is to identify those uses that
create utility not only for the direct user of the expression but also
for many others. Stated differently, we seek uses of expressive
works in which the uses themselves create identifiable and widely
spread positive externalities. The list of privileged uses must take
account of the needs of administrable doctrine as well. The nature
of the use that is privileged must not rely on private information,
for example.
In this Section, we propose several obvious candidates for the
list of privileged uses and also explore several categories of uses
that are already important in current fair use litigation. Our theory
does not always direct courts to find fair use. In fact, it calls into
question many aspects of fair use jurisprudence, as it currently
exists. At the same time, our theory directs courts to find fair use
in many instances that would not be recognized as such under
extant case law. Together, these categories demonstrate how our
approach requires us to rethink some foundational notions that
have shaped fair use law.
a) Politicalspeech. The most obvious example of a privileged category for fair use doctrine is political speech. Political
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speech is already conferred an exalted status in First Amendment
doctrine14l and for very important reasons. Political speech is an
integral ingredient in self-governance, and therefore it is critical
to the functioning of democracy.142 From an economic point of view,
the social value of political speech is somewhat difficult to describe.
Professor Robert Cooter suggests that political speech should be
seen as a kind of "merit good";143 Professor Richard Musgrave controversially developed the term "merit goods" to describe goods
that individuals in society "need" notwithstanding their unwillingness to pay.- Specifically, Cooter argues that free speech enhances societal liberty (and therefore utility) in a manner that is
greater than the public's preference for consuming the good.145
But it is not necessary for us to endorse this controversial theory
in order to establish that political speech is a valuable category
for prima facie protection under fair use doctrine. It is enough for
us to note that political uses of speech are thought to promote selfgovernance in a democratic society, and thus create widespread
nonpecuniary follow-on benefits throughout society. These benefits accrue not only to the political speaker but to many others
that do not directly use the expression. Political speech thus falls
directly within our definition of categories for prima facie protection.
Controversies regarding fair use and the political use of
speech have arisen in the past. One journalist has gone so far as
to say, "If you're a candidate for president, there's a good chance
you've been sued-or at least threatened-by a musician... [for]
using popular songs at [your] campaign rallies."146 The American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) has published guidelines urging politicians to purchase licenses to use
music in their campaign rallies; the guidelines do not reference
the possibility of a fair use claim.147

See BeVier, 30 Stan L Rev at 309 (cited in note 18).
Brown v Hartlage, 456 US 45, 60 (1982) (noting that the First Amendment functions "as the guardian of our democracy'); Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The
ConstitutionalPowers of the People 24-25 (Harper & Brothers 1960).
143 Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution313 (Princeton 2000).
144 Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance:A Study in Public Economy
13--15 (McGraw-Hill 1959).
145 Cooter, The Strategic Constitution at 310-12 (cited in note 143).
146 Joel Rose, Music in Political Campaigns 101 (NPR Music, Feb 29, 2012), online at
http://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/201202/29/147592568music-in-politica -campaigns
-101 (visited Jan 22, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable).
147 Using Music in Political Campaigns: What You Should Know (ASCAP), archived
at http://perma.cc/9MQ7-2E2S. Interestingly, Professor Rebecca Tushnet argues that political uses of songs are almost inherently transformative and thus should be judged fair
141
142
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Our theory suggests that all political uses of expressions
should be presumptive fair uses. This does not mean that political
speech should be unprotected by copyright law; the fair use doctrine protects uses, rather than entire expressions. Thus, a commercial use of a political tract by Newt Gingrich would infringe
Gingrich's copyright, while a political use of a Fleetwood Mac song
would presumptively be a fair use even if the song had nothing
whatsoever to do with political affairs.
Our approach would constitute a departure from extant jurisprudence. This is best seen by reexamining one of the Supreme
Court's most important pronouncements on the scope of fair useits ruling in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises.148 Harper & Row involved the publication of a news story
by The Nation that included between three and four hundred
words of unlicensed quotations from former President Gerald
Ford's A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford.
Drawing directly from the autobiography, the story in The Nation
described Ford's perspective on his decision to pardon former
President Richard Nixon of all crimes related to the Watergate
affair.149 The Court acknowledged that The Nation was engaging
in news reporting and that First Amendment concerns came into
play, particularly since Ford was a public figure and the speech
concerned politics.150 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court dismissed
The Nation's claim of fair use and found that The Nation had unlawfully infringed on Harper & Row's copyright in the Ford autobiography by copying text without a license.151
Two factors appeared to weigh heavily on the Court in its considerations. First, Harper & Row had sold to Time for $25,000 the
right to publish an excerpt of the autobiography prior to publication of the book as a whole. The 7,500-word excerpt in Time would
have concerned Ford's pardon of Nixon. However, after The Nation's "scoop," Time cancelled the contract and refused to make
payment on the outstanding $12,500, because there was little
news value to the excerpt after The Nation story appeared. 152 The
Court viewed this as clear evidence of the fact that the claimed
uses in a fair use doctrine that protects transformative uses. See Tushnet, 114 Yale L J at
572-73 (cited at note 61). From our perspective, the transformativeness of the use is neither here nor there. A political use is prima facie fair, whether transformative or not.
148 471 US 539 (1985).
149 Id at 542-45.
150 Id at 555-60.
161 Id at 569.
152 Harper & Row, 471 US at 542-43.
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fair use had imposed a significant cost on the market for the
work.153
Second, Harper & Row had not yet published the full autobiography. Rather, the autobiography's first appearance was in the
quotations within The Nation's news story, violating what the
Court labeled the "author's control of first public distribution."154
While the Court acknowledged that "first publication" by an unlicensed user should not be an absolute bar to a claim of fair use,155
the Court also noted that fair use was traditionally understood to
be based on the author's implied consent to a "reasonable and customary use," and it was unlikely that authors would consent to
giving a first-publication license to an uncoordinated news
"scoop.156 The Court thus suggested that the use was
presumptively unfair.
The Court's approach in Harper& Row has been criticized for
its miserliness toward fair use claims.157 In particular, critics have
asked whether three to four hundred words should truly be considered a significant portion of a full-length autobiography.158 By
refusing The Nation's claim to fair use, the Court found the market effects of unlicensed copying of an extremely small amount of
the copyrighted work to be significant enough to warrant upholding the rights of the author.
Under our approach, the Court would have to uphold the
claim of fair use. Given The Nation's use of the quotations for political speech, it would be unnecessary for the Court to engage in
any extended analysis of the length of the quotations or the effect
on prepublication contracts. The political use of the quotations
would make The Nation's use prima facie fair. As indicated by the
very small portion of the original work used, it would not be possible to argue that The Nation had an ulterior motive in quoting

153 Id at 567.
154 Id at 555.
155 Id at 552-55.
156 Harper & Row, 471 US at 542, 550-51 (quotation marks omitted).
157 See, for example, Joseph P. Bauer, Copyrightand the FirstAmendment: Comrades,
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev 831, 860-61 (2010) (describing how
the Court "got it wrong" in Harper & Row); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of
Expression in HistoricalPerspective, 10 J Intel Prop L 319, 320-21 (2003) (highlighting the
critical response to the Court's decision and the congressional response); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright's Paradox 63-65 (Oxford 2008); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand L Rev 1, 64-65 (1987); Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at
2565 (cited in note 134).
158 See, for example, Bauer, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev at 860 (cited in note 157); Samuelson,
77 Fordham L Rev at 2564 (cited in note 134).
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the original. Indeed, The Nation might have directly excerpted far
larger portions of the original and could still have credibly argued
that its aim was to engage in political speech. Thus, the Court
would be left to ask only whether the loss of prepublication contracts (and the attendant diminution of the advance that would
be offered by Harper & Row) would be sufficient to defeat the incentives for Ford to write his autobiography. The near-certain answer would be "no." Ford would certainly want to write his autobiography, even if Harper & Row had to reduce his advance fee
by $25,000 or more. 159 This is due not only to the continued expected market for the full autobiography but also to the presumed
interest of a retiring president in presenting his own version of
his biography to the public.
b) Truth seeking. A second example of a privileged category for fair use doctrine is truth seeking. What we mean by
"truth seeking" is uses of copyrighted expressions that aim at establishing or identifying the truth of a matter. This category
would encompass not only news reporting but also, and perhaps
more importantly, research and teaching.
Research and news reporting are not only explicitly mentioned in § 107 as two of the types of uses at which fair use is
aimed,160 but they are also fairly well implied by the constitutional
copyright scheme, which explicitly aims to promote "[s]cience," or
knowledge.161 This suggests that uses of expression aimed at establishing the truth of some matter should be treated as presumptively fair. Showing clips of a film in order to show that digital
effects have troublesome color variations would therefore be presumptively within the scope of fair use, while using the same clips
of film to promote the sale of DVDs would apparently be outside
of fair use.
Truth seeking produces clear follow-on benefits beyond the
immediate users of a copyrighted expression. Science advances by

159 The figure a court would have to use in calculating the effect of a fair use finding
on incentives is $25,000 because this represents the full value of the prepublication excerpt
contract. The finding of fair use ex post would result in only the $12,500 cost of the ex post
cancellation of the contract. However, if Harper & Row knew that all prepublication stories
of the kind The Nation published would be found as fair use, and it knew that the ability
to keep the manuscript under wraps until publication was limited, it would likely expect
that it could not realize any gain from the sale of prepublication excerpts from political
biographies.
160 17 USC § 107.
161 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8.
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cumulative understandings of examined phenomena. As advances are reported, others examining the same phenomena can
incorporate the findings (or criticize them) in their own research.
The same is true of history or news reporting. The aggregate
growth in understanding benefits not only the particular person
who uses any given copyrighted expression but also all others who
benefit from the growth in knowledge.
Deciding whether uses of an expression constitute truth seeking may sound daunting and appear difficult to administer judicially. Fortunately, judicial determinations of the use of the expressions in truth seeking are familiar from an entirely different
context: the rules of evidence. More specifically, the admissibility
of hearsay evidence depends crucially on the use to which it is
put. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible when used to prove some
propositions, but admissible to prove others. To rule on the admissibility of hearsay, a judge must determine not only whether
the evidence is used to prove the truth of a matter but also what
particular matter it is being used to prove. 162 The precise determination of the purpose of the use of truth-seeking speech in the
context of fair use should therefore be a familiar one to courts,
and one that they can carry out.
As with political speech, extant case law fails to show sufficient solicitousness to truth-seeking uses, which in our theory are
presumptively treated as fair. Consider the case of American Geophysical Union v Texaco Inc.163 The case concerned the practices of
hundreds of scientists working for the oil company Texaco in research aimed at producing new products and technology in the
petroleum industry. The scientists, working at several of Texaco's
research centers, photocopied articles they found of interest from
journals to which the Texaco library subscribed. They used the
articles for archival research purposes-that is, they kept the articles on the shelf for consultation as they researched relevant
topics. 164 Acknowledging that the articles were copyrighted and
that the photocopying was unlicensed, Texaco claimed fair use. 165
In analyzing the viability of the fair use defense, the Second Circuit-both the majority and the dissent-focused on the issue of
transaction costs. The main inquiry was whether there existed a
162 Clifford S. Fishman, 4 Jones on Evidence: Civil and Criminal §§ 24:1, 24:6, 26:1,
27:1, 28:2 (West 7th ed 2000).
163 60 F3d 913 (2d Cir 1994).
164 Id at 915.
165 Id at 914-15.
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market mechanism that enabled research institutes to efficiently
clear reproduction rights. The majority found that such a mechanism existed in the form of the Copyright Clearance Center-a
clearinghouse that dealt with copyrights in scientific publications
on behalf of the publishers. Based on this finding, the majority
rejected the defendant's fair use defense.166 The dissent, by contrast, believed that the Copyright Clearance Center did not function effectively and that consequently it could not have been relied on to streamline transactions between copyright owners and
researchers. Hence, the dissent was willing to recognize a fair use
defense.167 The case is a textbook example of how courts should
work under the transaction cost view of fair use. It also provides
a vivid illustration of the limitations of the transaction cost theory;
after all, the majority and the dissent could not agree on the magnitude of the cost of transacting in this case or whether it justified
a finding of fair use.
Our analysis points courts in a different direction. To us, the
issue is not the level of transaction costs or the feasibility of market transactions. Rather, it is the basic question whether archival
research uses of works produce nonpecuniary benefits to nonusers. Accordingly, the focus of the inquiry in Texaco should have
been on the nature of the use. Specifically, the court should have
inquired into whether the reproduction of the scientific articles
significantly advances research projects (in which case the use
should have been deemed fair) or is strictly for archival purposes
unrelated to the advancement of research (in which case fair use
should have been denied). The question whether there is a functioning market for article reprints is largely beside the point. The
only question that courts should address is whether archival storage of the kind practiced by Texaco would defeat the incentives to
produce the journal articles that were subject to litigation in the
Texaco case. We would hazard a guess: not likely.168

Id at 929-32.
Texaco, 60 F3d at 940-41 (Jacobs dissenting).
168 The dissenting opinion by Judge Dennis Jacobs in Texaco considered this issue
and concluded that the incentives provided by copyright law were sufficient to secure an
exponential increase in scientific publications. Id at 940 (Jacobs dissenting). The majority
opinion, on the other hand, did not examine in detail whether the publisher's incentives
would be considerably reduced by the infringing use in question. It observed only that
"evidence concerning the effect of Texaco's photocopying of individual articles ... is of
somewhat limited significance in determining and evaluating the effect. . . 'upon the potential market for or value of' the individual articles." Id at 928.
166
167
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Digital libraries provide another interesting context in which
fair use has been debated recently and on which our theory casts
light. The issue has come up in a trio of cases: Authors Guild, Inc
v Google Inc,169 Authors Guild, Inc v HathiTrust,170 and Cambridge University Press v Becker.171 All three cases raised a common legal issue: What is the status of digital libraries under the
fair use doctrine? Google, the most famous case of the three, concerned the Google Books Library Project, Google's scanning of
twenty million books in order to include them in a fully searchable
database.172 The second case, HathiTrust, involved a much
smaller version of the same type of project. HathiTrust, a research community that is comprised, inter alia, of several universities, had set up a searchable digital library173 Finally, Becker
addressed the legality of Georgia State University's plan to put
digital copies of books and other academic materials on electronic
174
course reserves.
The first two cases-Google and HathiTrust-resulted in
findings of fair use. 175 In the third case, the district court also
found fair use. 176 However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disapproved of the district court's use of rigid quantitative benchmarks,
such as allowing the use of one chapter or up to 10 percent of a
work, and remanded the case back to the district court 177 with
clear instructions to adhere to the highly contextual and flexible
approach adopted by other courts. 178 In our analysis, all three
cases reached (roughly) the correct result.
The aggregation of copyrighted works to form a searchable
database creates an unparalleled research tool that cannot be otherwise duplicated. This means that the use of works in this fashion should be considered a prima facie fair use until the point at
which incentives to create are eliminated. In both Google and HathiTrust, the organizations putting together the databases employed sufficient restrictions to prevent the databases from serving
954 F Supp 2d 282 (SDNY 2013).
755 F3d 87 (2d Cir 2014).
171 863 F Supp 2d 1190 (ND Ga 2012).
172 Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 285-86.
173 It is noteworthy that HathiTrust also wished to grant access to the works to printdisabled users and to ensure the preservation of the works in its database. See HathiTrust,
755 F3d at 91.
174 Becker, 863 F Supp 2d at 1201.
175 Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 293-94; HathiTrust,755 F3d at 101, 103.
176 Becker, 863 F Supp 2d at 1242-43, 1363-64.
177 Patton,769 F3d at 1275, revg Becker, 863 F Supp 2d 1190.
17s Patton, 769 F3d at 1271-72, 1283.
169
170
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as complete substitutes for the original works. Google Books, for
example, limits the ability of database readers to see the full
works; readers are able to see only "snippets" of the full text. 179
These restrictions mean that those who want to read a book will
still have to purchase a copy; the main use of the database is to
find relevant books or quotations regarding a point of interest.
The reasoning of the Second Circuit in finding fair use in both
Google and HathiTrust, particularly the special emphasis the
judges put on public benefit, is highly consistent with our theory.
The use of searchable digital depositories of copyrightable works
creates immeasurable benefit for the public at large. In the words
of Judge Denny Chin:
The benefits of the Library Project are many. First, Google
Books provides a new and efficient way for readers and researchers to find books. ... Second, in addition to being an
important reference tool, Google Books greatly promotes a
type of research referred to as "data mining" or "text mining."
...Third, Google Books expands access to books. In particular, traditionally underserved populations will benefit as
they gain knowledge of and access to far more books ...
Fourth, Google Books helps to preserve books and give them
new life.. .. Finally, by helping readers and researchers identify books, Google Books benefits authors and publishers.180
Importantly, the benefits listed by Chin lie outside any of the
individual books included in the project, and no work on its own
could produce them. Furthermore, the fact that Google allowed
readers to view only small portions of the works without being able
to reproduce them led Chin to conclude that the project "advances
the progress of the arts and sciences, while maintaining respectful
consideration for the rights of authors and other creative individuals, and without adversely impacting the rights of copyright holders."'181 The same is true of the contested use in HathiTrust.
The Georgia State case, by contrast, calls for a more cautious
approach. The inclusion of digital copies in courses' electronic reserves clearly provides a significant benefit to students. It is conceivable that some of this benefit comes in the form of advancing
research, but a better way of characterizing the use is educational
(or teaching), which is a category we address below. As we note,
179
180
181

Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 286-87.
Id at 287-88.
Id at 293.
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it is not certain that the category ought to be treated as entitled
to the status of a prima facie fair use. Additionally, if universities
and other educational institutions were permitted under the
scope of fair use to include complete copies of mandatory, copyrighted course materials in course portals, it is likely that authors' incentives to create at least some of these works would be
in jeopardy. Thus, a more contextual approach is warranted.
As the Georgia State case shows, the categories of claimed
fair uses will not always be crystal clear. For instance, there will
naturally be some cases in which the categories of truth seeking
and political speech overlap. Harper & Row can be considered
such a case. It involved the use of copyrighted expression to report
the news; the news it involved was essentially political, and it
thus concerned political speech. In our view, this simply makes
the Harper & Row case easier to identify as one involving a presumptively fair use of an expression. Once the use is presumptively fair, it is not relevant whether it is presumptively fair due
to one or several categories. Likewise, there is no need to characterize the intensity of the use in order to establish the presumption of fair use. The only question remaining for the court-regardless of whether Harper & Row is treated as a case of
presumptive fair use due to news reporting or due to political
speech-is whether recognizing the specific kind of fair use would
eliminate the incentives for creation.
c) Criticism and comment. Although we have noted that
there is no reason to restrict the categories of presumptive fair
use specifically to those mentioned in the first paragraph of § 107,
there is likewise no good reason to automatically discount § 107.
Section 107 offers an illustrative list of fair use purposes: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, [and] research."182 We have already assimilated scholarship, research, and news reporting into
our analysis within the broader framework of truth seeking. We
now turn to the remaining trio of criticism, comment, and teaching.
Criticism and comment, in our minds, can be lumped together
as uses aimed at evaluating existing works for a wider audience.
In essence, criticism and comment allow an audience to experience a work indirectly, through the medium of a different user's
reaction to it. Audiences can also combine direct and indirect experiences, consuming the work together with the user's opinion of
182 17 USC § 107.
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it. For instance, a listener may read a critical review of a musical
performance while listening to a recording of it to help herself
form her own opinion of the piece or to compare notes with the
critic.
In one sense, all criticism produces follow-on benefits for nonusers. The critic records her impressions of the copyrighted work
for others to consume, rather than simply for herself. At the same
time, criticism does not neatly fall into the category of a use that
provides widespread nonpecuniary follow-on benefits among nonusers. In many cases, the consumption of criticism is localized
among users of the copyrighted work itself. In the most extreme
cases, the criticism and comment are enjoyed solely by those who
are consumers of the original work. Some kinds of works by fans
of cult television series, for instance, can be enjoyed only by those
who have already experienced every second of every episode of the
series. That group will almost always be very small and the benefits will not be widespread. Criticism and comment are therefore
controversial candidates for categories of prima facie fair uses in
our theory.
Altogether, we come out on the side of treating criticism and
comment as prima facie fair uses-but it is worth adding two notes.
First, recall the classic case of Folsom v Marsh,183 which introduced
the English rule of fair use to American jurisprudence. The case
involved a two-volume biography of President George Washington,
comprised almost entirely of copied letters and interstitial text.
The interstitial text was new, but the copied letters were used
184
without license, and they comprised 353 (!) pages of the text.
While the case has been cited for a number of propositions, the
most important for our purposes is the court's reliance on a line
between, on the one hand, good faith use of the original "for the
purposes of fair and reasonable criticism," and on the other hand,
using the original "with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede
1 5
the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it."'
Even if we recognize criticism and comment as prima facie fair
uses, there will still be cases in which courts should reject the claim
that the infringing use is actually criticism and comment. In some
cases, as in Folsom, the court should recognize that the claim of
criticism and comment is merely a subterfuge. Interestingly, from
the point of view of our theory, Folsom involved a different category
183
184
185

9 F Cases 342 (CCD Mass 1841).
See id at 345.
Id at 344-45.
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of use-political speech, rather than criticism and comment. Nonetheless, the result should be the same. It is not credible that the
wholesale copying of 353 pages involved a good faith writing of a
biography of Washington for political purposes.
Second, even if one were to reject our classification of criticism and comment as prima facie fair uses, it would not follow
that criticism and comment should fall outside the scope of fair
use altogether. As we noted earlier, our theory is intended to be
cumulative. It still makes sense under our theory to allow the defendant to prove that a finding of fair use is warranted when excessive transaction costs are expected to block a socially optimal
transaction.
d) Education. Educational uses, too, make a mixed case
for recognition as prima facie fair uses. "Teaching" is explicitly
mentioned in § 107 as a fair use purpose. However, it is not entirely clear that education neatly fits within the description of a
use that produces widespread nonpecuniary benefits for nonusers. Education is generally a bilateral transaction between
teacher and student (or multiple students); the users of educational copyrighted materials, whether teachers or students, are
the beneficiaries. In this sense, there is little reason to include
education as a prima facie category of fair use. On the other hand,
education is widely thought to create societal benefits beyond
those conferred on the direct participants in and beneficiaries of
education, for example, a reduction in crime.186 Additionally, education has a clear and obvious connection with uses that are
prima facie fair uses in our theory, such as truth seeking.
We suggest that the stronger argument would omit education
from a list of prima facie fair uses. Fair use in educational settings
could be claimed, therefore, only when the use could fairly be categorized as political speech, research, truth seeking, criticism, or
another prima facie fair use, or when the use was small enough
that it could be justified by a transaction cost argument. This
would still allow for a wide scope of fair uses in educational settings, but not nearly as many as for political speech, for instance.
Our approach would accord with a number of recent decisions
that have been conservative with findings of fair use in education

186 See generally Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on
Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 Am Econ Rev 155
(2004); Stephen Machin, Olivier Marie, and Sun~ica Vuji6, The Crime Reducing Effect of
Education, 121 Econ J 463 (2011).
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settings. A series of cases in the 1980s and 1990s dealt with photocopying materials for university classes.187 Courts were generally unsympathetic to the claim that universities and copy shops
could, within the framework of fair use, photocopy all the course
materials needed by a student for a given class. 188 Negotiations
between some of the interested parties led to two sets of informal
guidelines for determining whether course-related copying is fair:
the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-forProfitEducationalInstitutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals 89 and the Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music.190 The
guidelines include research within the category of educational
uses; we would separate the two categories. Otherwise, however,
the guidelines are largely positive from our perspective. They attempt to demark uses that are sufficiently small to warrant a
finding of fair use. In many cases, the guidelines offer quantitative benchmarks. This is a means of offering greater certainty
within a transaction cost analysis of fair use. 191 While the two sets
of guidelines have not been adopted into law in any formal proceeding, they have received largely sympathetic treatment in case
law.192 In some ways, the Georgia State case mentioned above also
reflects this approach.
D.

Other Illustrations of the Proposed Fair Use Doctrine

To further illustrate how our proposed doctrine would work,
and to contrast it with existing doctrine, we also consider several
issues that have arisen in prior fair use litigation that do not necessarily fall into categories of prima facie fair uses. Applying the
proposed new test to some old cases provides some interesting results, confirming the results in some cases and rejecting them in
others.

187 See Princeton University Press v Michigan Document Services, Inc, 99 F3d 1381,
1383 (6th Cir 1996) (en banc); Blackwell Publishing,Inc v Excel Research Group,LLC, 661

F Supp 2d 786, 788 (ED Mich 2009); Basic Books, 758 F Supp at 1526.
188 See, for example, Princeton University Press, 99 F3d at 1391; Blackwell Publishing, 661 F Supp 2d at 794; Basic Books, 758 F Supp at 1534-37.
189 See generally Copyright Law Revision, HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess
68-70 (1976).
190 See id at 70-71. See also Crews, 62 Ohio St L J at 615-20 (cited in note 129).
191 See Parchomovsky and Goldman, 93 Va L Rev at 1506-08 (cited in note 40).
192 See, for example, Princeton University Press, 99 F3d at 1390-91; Texaco, 60 F3d
at 919 n 5; Marcus v Rowley, 695 F2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir 1983).
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1. Parodies.
Courts applying fair use have long struggled with the question of how to treat parodies. Perhaps the best illustration of the
courts' confusion can be found in two Ninth Circuit cases decided
by the same judge in 1955. Both Jack Benny and Sid Caesar had
parodied movies on their television shows: Benny's sketch parodied the film Gaslight,193 and Caesar's parodied From Here to
Eternity.9 While there was little to distinguish the two parodies,
the court approved Caesar's as fair use while rejecting Benny's as
an unacceptable unlicensed appropriation of a copyrighted work.195
Along the way, the court in each case emphasized that its central
concern was with the amount of material used by the parody, rather than the style or target of the humorous work. In Benny's case,
for example, the court noted that "the words 'burlesque,' 'parody,'
'satire' and 'travesty' are often used interchangeably.196
A new course was charted by the Supreme Court in Campbell.
Campbell involved an infringement suit by the holder of the copyright in the song "Oh, Pretty Woman" (composed by Roy Orbison
and Bill Dees) against the rap group 2 Live Crew. 2 Live Crew released to the public a song entitled "Pretty Woman" that borrowed
extensively from Orbison's hit without permission.197 While 2 Live
Crew acknowledged seeking and failing to obtain permission from
the copyright owner, the Supreme Court found the rap group's
use of the original could be a fair use and therefore noninfringing.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice David Souter explained
that 2 Live Crew's song "reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it."198 He argued that parodists have a special claim to fair use for two reasons. First, original authors are unlikely to license parodies of their works. 199
Second, parodies are especially valuable to society on account of
their transformative nature. 200 Importantly, the Court denied
that all parodic works were of equal value. The Court took pains
to distinguish the favored parodies from the less protected satires.
193 Loew's Inc v Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 131 F Supp 165, 167 (SD Cal 1955).
194 Columbia Pictures Corp v National BroadcastingCo, 137 F Supp 348, 351-52 (SD
Cal 1955).
195 Contrast Loew's Inc, 131 F Supp at 183, with Columbia Pictures Corp, 137 F Supp
at 353-54.
196 Loew's, 131 F Supp at 176 n 31.
197 Campbell, 510 US at 572-73.
198 Id at 583.
199 Id at 592.
200 Id at 579.
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The "nub" of parody, according to the Court, is "the use of some
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that,
at least in part, comments on that author's works,201 while satire
"has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original
composition [but rather] merely uses [it] to get attention or to
avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh."202
The Campbell decision changed preexisting understandings
of fair use in two important respects. First, it emphasized the importance of transformativeness in fair use determinations-an aspect that led to a revolution in the way fair use cases were decided.203 Second, the Court effectively created a "safe harbor" for
parodies within fair use; although the Court never said that parodies are per se fair, commentators and courts alike understood
the instruction they received from the Court as suggestive of this
outcome. 2 4 The reaction to the ruling was swift. After Campbell,
defendants have sought to emphasize that their use, whatever it
might be, is transformative and therefore fair.205 Likewise, defendants in fair use cases have gone to great distances to persuade
courts that their putatively infringing works were parodies, and
whenever they were successful, a fair use ruling ensued.206 Practically, parodies are almost guaranteed a fair use finding. Strikingly,
Campbell, 510 US at 580.
Id.
203 Michelle B. Lee and Erin M. Hickey, The ChangingLandscape of Fair Use: 'Transformative' Is Key (Law360, Apr 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3VY6-SZJ3 (noting
that "courts began to increasingly emphasize whether a use was 'transformative' after the
Campbell decision"). See also Sag, 73 Ohio St L J at 76-77 (cited in note 8).
204 See, for example, Burnett v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, 491 F Supp 2d 962,
968-69 (CD Cal 2007) (interpreting Campbell to hold that if a work is likely to be reasonably perceived as a parody, then it is a fair use); Mattel Inc v Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F3d 792, 806 (9th Cir 2003); Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 268 F3d
1257, 1268 (11th Cir 2001); Lyons Partnership,LP v Giannoulas, 14 F Supp 2d 947, 955
(ND Tex 1998). See also Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at 2550-51 (cited in note 134);
Pamela Samuelson, PossibleFutures of Fair Use, 90 Wash L Rev 815, 821 (2015) ("Although
the Court in Campbell expressly declined to adopt a presumption that parodies of copyrighted works were fair uses, the parody case law after Campbell has resulted in many
fair use rulings.... [This trend suggests] that parodies are de facto presumptively fair.")
(citations omitted).
205 See, for example, Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 290-91; HathiTrust,755 F3d at 97-98;
Cariou, 714 F3d at 698-99; Perfect 10, 508 F3d at 1164-67; Blanch, 467 F3d at 251-53;
Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F3d 811, 818-20 (9th Cir 2003); On Davis v Gap, Inc, 246
F3d 152, 174-76 (2d Cir 2001); Castle Rock Entertainment,Inc v Carol PublishingGroup,
Inc, 150 F3d 132, 142-43 (2d Cir 1998).
206 See, for example, Brownmark Films, LLC v Comedy Partners,800 F Supp 2d 991,
1001-02 (ED Wis 2011) (holding that South Park'spartial use of a music video was parody
and fair use); Burnett, 491 F Supp 2d at 971-72, 974-75; Suntrust Bank, 268 F3d at 1276;
Leibovitz v ParamountPictures Corp, 137 F3d 109, 117 (2d Cir 1998); Lyons Partnership,
201

202

1102

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1051

satires are not entitled to the same status and are treated like all
other putatively infringing works-that is, they are subject to the
207
balancing test of § 107 and they are often denied fair use.
Indeed, in many cases, the entirety of the court's decision
turns on whether the allegedly infringing work is best viewed as
a parody or as a satire. Sometimes, the alleged infringer attempts
to shape the likely outcome with labeling. Consider the case of Dr.
Seuss Enterprises,LP v PenguinBooks USA, Inc.208 Writing under
the pen name "Dr. Juice," Alan Katz authored a book called The
Cat Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, which, as the district
court noted, mimicked the distinctive style of the Dr. Seuss29 family of works in rhyme, illustration, and packaging.210 The district
court rejected Katz's claim that his book was a parody of Dr.
Seuss's works that could copy from the Dr. Seuss books under the
rubric of fair use. Instead, the court found Katz's book to be an
unprotected satire that made "no [ ] attempt to comment upon the
text or themes of The Cat in the Hat"and other Dr. Seuss books.211
Indeed, said the Court of Appeals, the use of Dr. Seuss's work was
"pure shtick" intended merely to retell the story of O.J. Simpson's
murder trial.212
Viewed from our vantage point, the Supreme Court got it backward in Campbell. Under our test, it is political satires that should
most obviously be considered prima facie fair, whereas it is less obvious that parodies and other types of works that function primarily as criticisms of the original should receive solicitous treatment.
Political parodies, such as Saturday Night Live's famous spoof of
Sarah Palin's interview with Katie Coric,213 are clearly political

14 F Supp 2d at 955 (holding that a mascot's use of the "Barney dance" at sporting events
was a parody and fair use).,
207 See, for example, Blanch, 467 F3d at 254-55, 259 (considering the work more of a
satire, yet favoring the defendant after considering the four factors); Williams v Columbia
BroadcastingSystems, Inc, 57 F Supp 2d 961, 969 (CD Cal 1999); Columbia PicturesIndustries, Inc v Miramax Films Corp, 11 F Supp 2d 1179, 1187 (CD Cal 1998); Dr. Seuss
Enterprises,LP v PenguinBooks USA, Inc, 924 F Supp 1559, 1569-70 (SD Cal 1996) (holding that a work's nature as satire was insufficient for a fair use defense, but that parody
was sufficient).
208 924 F Supp 1559 (SD Cal 1996).
209 Dr. Seuss was the pen name of Theodor S. Geisel. Id at 1561.
210 Id.
211 Id at 1569.
212 Dr. Seuss Enterprises,LP v Penguin Books USA, Inc, 109 F3d 1394, 1401-03 (9th
Cir 1997).
213 Andrew O'Hehir, Tina Fey's Sarah Palin:When "SaturdayNight Live" Finally Got
PoliticalSatire Right (Salon, Feb 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SYQ8-ENYS.
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speech and play a central role in democratic self-governance. Parodies that make light of the original work, like book reviews and
other critical works, may also fall within the scope of fair use, 214 but
their demand for the protection of fair use is less pressing. Many
parodies, however, serve nonpolitical purposes and thus do not provide as substantial a follow-on benefit to society.
2. Personal use.
Personal uses of works have enjoyed a mixed reception in fair
use jurisprudence. The high mark of personal uses, without
doubt, was the Supreme Court's ruling in Sony.
As previously noted, in Sony the Supreme Court ruled that
the practice of home consumers recording programs for their own
later viewing-"time shifting"-was a protected fair use. 215 This
would appear to anchor the idea that even large-scale infringements-including copying of entire works-would fall within the
bounds of fair use so long as the copying were for personal, noncommercial uses.
Yet notwithstanding this ruling, subsequent attempts to anchor personal use copying as fair uses were far less successful.
The clearest example of the mixed fate of personal uses in fair use
litigation can be found in a number of attempts to win fair use
protection for "space shifting"-the copying of works from one medium to a different medium for personal, noncommercial uses.
This occurs, for instance, when someone records music from an
older format (such as a CD) to a newer format (such as an MP3
file) .216

Perhaps the most resounding failure of the personal fair use
arguments was the Napster litigation.217 Napster was a company
that created and marketed software and network services that
permitted users to transfer and share files through the internet.218
Napster featured two central innovations. First, it employed a
peer-to-peer transfer technology that permitted users to transfer
files directly to one another without having to go through the central server. This eliminated bottlenecks and sped up file transfers. Second, Napster offered directory software that permitted
See Suntrust Bank, 268 F3d at 1267-76; Leibovitz, 137 F3d at 114-17.
Sony, 464 US at 456.
216 A&MRecords, Inc v Napster,Inc, 114 F Supp 2d 896, 904 (ND Cal 2000).
217 Id at 896, affd in part and revd in part, 239 F3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001), on remand,
2001 WL 777005 (ND Cal), affd, 284 F3d 1091 (9th Cir 2002).
218 A&MRecords, 114 F Supp 2d at 901.
214
215
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users to locate files of other users and initiate downloads.219 Napster was aimed, in particular, at consumers of digital music
files.220 Napster permitted millions of users to obtain digital copies
of copyrighted music from one another without ever obtaining a
license for the distribution or copying.221 Music companies sued
Napster for its facilitation of and direct involvement in the in222
fringing acts.
Napster's legal strategy was based on the Supreme Court's
ruling in Sony. Napster claimed that one of the main uses of Napster software was "space shifting"-the practice of copying from
obsolete format to usable digital format music to which the consumer had already purchased a license.22 Of course, it was not
Napster that directly engaged in copying. Rather, it was Napster
users who did so. Napster users who wanted to space shift their
music from computer to computer would make MP3 copies of their
older CD formats and then use Napster to transfer the files. Napster claimed this was a near-perfect analogue to the Sony case. As
in Sony, Napster claimed that it was doing nothing more than
distributing an article of commerce that was sometimes used by
consumers for forbidden copying, but was at other times used for
permissible fair use copying.224 The key for Napster's success was
to convince the court that "space shifting" was, like "time shifting," a fair use. On this point, unfortunately, Napster failed.225
The district court dismissed the space-shifting argument on
multiple grounds. It found that the amount of pure space shifting
was small, such that even if space shifting were a personal use
recognized as fair, Napster could not enjoy the benefit of the Sony
ruling to protect itself from other infringing activities by Napster
and its users. 226 But the district court went beyond simply rejecting the applicability of Sony. The court cast doubt on whether
space shifting should be recognized as a fair use at all. While not
entirely ruling out the possibility that space shifting might be a
fair use, the court rejected several of the arguments that were
proffered in favor of considering space shifting a fair use, and it

219

See A&MRecords, 239 F3d at 1011-12.

220

Id at 1017.
Id at 1015.

221
222
223

Id at 1011, 1013.
A&MRecords, 239 F3d at 1019.

225

Id at 1021.
Id at 1019.

226

A&MRecords, 114 F Supp 2d at 904-05.

224
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carefully refrained from ever endorsing the claim that space shifting is fair.227 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that space shifting should not be viewed as a fair use, at least in the context of
Napster's business. The court emphasized that, given the way
that Napster's technology worked, any user who utilized Napster
to space shift would necessarily expose the "shifted" files to other
Napster users who would wish to make their own copies.228
The Napster ruling has engendered a great deal of discussion,
as well as some controversy. 229 However, space shifting has not
won general endorsement as fair use in case law since then, notwithstanding the plausible argument that space shifting is a
quintessential personal, noncommercial use. From the perspective of our theory, this makes sense. It may well be that Congress
has no interest in barring unauthorized, noncommercial, personal
uses. However, such personal uses do not fit into the broader purposes of fair use as we understand them. By definition, personal
uses are not likely to produce widespread follow-on utility to nonusers. While the doctrine is underinclusive of particularly highvalue personal uses, these uses are so rare that they need not factor into the doctrine.
This is not to say that there can be no argument for limiting
enforcement of copyright against purely noncommercial personal
uses. In fact, there are three possible arguments. First, given
what appear to be strong social norms in favor of viewing such
uses as permitted, 230 it may be wise to limit enforcement in order
to keep the law in line with widespread social expectations. Second, many noncommercial personal uses will be sufficiently small
that transaction costs may prevent bargaining between the user
of the work and the copyright owner, even though it would be socially optimal for the work to be used. And third, the promise of
Id at 915-16.
A&MRecords, 239 F3d at 1019.
229 See, for example, Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U Chi L Rev 263, 298-311
(2002); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperationon the File-Swapping Networks, 89 Va L Rev 505, 576-82 (2003).
230 See Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection,51 Vill L Rev 921, 944 (2006); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture:
How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity
66-68, 124-26 (Penguin 2004); Steven A. Hetcher, The Music Industry's FailedAttempt to
Influence File Sharing Norms, 7 Vand J Enter L & Prac 10, 11 (2004); Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 Vill L Rev 13, 95
(2003); Dan L. Burk and Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructurefor Rights Management
Systems, 15 Harv J L & Tech 41, 65 (2001).
227
228
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nonenforcement may be necessary to encourage the development
and adoption of new technologies. For instance, purchasers of new
music-storage technology (such as dedicated digital music players
like the iPod) might want some assurance that their CD collections will not become completely obsolete before they purchase the
new technology.
The strength of these arguments will vary by technology. The
social norms surrounding the copying of music for personal enjoyment may not apply to artwork, for example. Transaction costs
will not only differ by technology; they will also change over time.
It is now evident-though it was not so evident twenty years
ago--that it is cost-effective to sell listeners digital recordings of
music by the song. And, at least in some cases, no assurances to
consumers were necessary to encourage them to adopt new technologies. DVDs supplanted videocassettes without giving consumers the ability or the right to transfer their recorded material
from videotape to DVD. DVDs, in turn, are being supplanted by
streaming video, again without the legal ability to transfer rights.
The optimal legal treatment for such personal uses may, therefore, vary by technology. And, indeed, the strongest judicial pronouncement in favor of legal protection of space shifting as within
the rights of users as a personal, noncommercial use came in Recording Industry Association of America v Diamond Multimedia
Systems Inc,231 a case that construed a provision of the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992232 (AHRA) that specifically permitted
the making of personal copies of digital music in certain circumstances. 233 While that case found such space shifting to be a "paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with
the purposes of the Act," the court did not rule that all noncommercial, personal uses are fair uses. 234
3. Fan fiction.
Fan fiction provides an interesting application of our theory.
For our purposes, the category of fan fiction encompasses noncommercial production-and often dissemination-of a broad range
of derivative works that rely on prior successful works. The Harry
Potter and The Hunger Games book series, the Star Wars movie
series, and the Star Trek television series are just a few well-known
231
232
233
234

180 F3d 1072 (9th Cir 1999).
Pub L No 102-563, 106 Stat 4237, codified at 17 USC § 1001 et seq.
Recording Industry Association of America, 180 F3d at 1079.
Id.
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examples of works that engendered a significant body of derivative
works by consumers. 235 The unlicensed derivative works, in many
cases, are the vehicles for extending enjoyment of the fictional
works to contexts that the original creators would never have
thought to explore.
Some scholars have called for the creation of a new legal privilege for fan fiction on grounds of self-expression,26 harnessing
cultural theory to support this initiative. Others have sought to
assimilate fan fiction within existing fair use doctrine. Professors
Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, for example, have contended that fan fiction should be entitled to a status of a presumptively fair use on the grounds that it is parodic and highly transformative. 237 Using this rationale, they have suggested that even

commercial fan fiction should be considered

fair.238

Our model offers a more nuanced and, we believe, clearer position. On our view, which once again focuses on the production of
dispersed nonpecuniary benefits to nonusers, fan fiction should
enjoy a presumptively fair status only if it is noncommercial and
only if it is disseminated to the public. Hence, noncommercial literary, musical, and audiovisual adaptations of works should be
considered fair, as long as they are made available to the public.
The same is true of noncommercial parties and costume parades.
Commercial merchandise, video games, and other derivative
works that are produced for profit would not be sheltered under
our theory.

TV. EXPLORING THE INTERFACE WITH OTHER THEORIES
Having presented our view of fair use in theory and in doctrine, we turn in this Part to an exploration of the way our proposed view of fair use interacts with related theoretical scholarship in the fields of property and copyright.

235 See generally Karen Hellekson and Kristina Busse, eds, FanFiction and Fan Communities in the Age of the Internet (McFarland 2006) (describing the plethora of fan fiction
stories derived from different original works).
236 See, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:Copyright, Fan Fiction,and a
New Common Law, 17 Loyola LA Enter L Rev 651, 655 (1997).
237 Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, Everyone's a Superhero:A Cultural Theory
of 'Mary Sue"FanFiction as Fair Use, 95 Cal L Rev 597, 615-17 (2007).
238 Id at 616.
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Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Copyright

We begin by looking at the obvious connections between our
theory and broader theories of the importance of free expression
in society, particularly in the context of the First Amendment and
its guarantee of freedom of speech. A number of scholars have
noted that there is some obvious tension between the strategies
chosen by free speech law and copyright law to encourage expression.239 Copyright law seeks to support expression by restricting
its use; free speech law seeks to support it by sweeping away restrictions. As we have noted, copyright law aims to give authors
the opportunity to realize pecuniary gain from expressions they
have created by giving them exclusive property rights over various uses of the expressions.240 Free speech law, by contrast, aims
to expand the scope and reach of various kinds of expression by

preventing government interference with the expressive

activity.241

Many scholars have tried to explain where the boundary between these two strategies lies. In particular, they have explored
when concerns of free speech should trump copyright law and permit unfettered expression that utilizes copyrighted speech.242 It is
undeniable that the two bodies of law adopt fundamentally opposite approaches to promoting speech in society. Professor Rebecca
Tushnet has provocatively labeled copyright "book burning mandated by law."243 Professor Julie Cohen has labeled copyright a
239 See, for example, Bauer, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev at 873-78 (cited in note 157); David
McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U Pitt L Rev
281, 287-91 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, BalancingCopyright Protectionsand Freedom of
Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional,36 Loyola LA L Rev 83, 9597 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the FirstAmendment Skein,
54 Stan L Rev 1, 12-20 (2001); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech
Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, CampaignFinance
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 BC L Rev 1, 4-27 (2000); Patterson, 40
Vand L Rev at 33-36 (cited in note 157); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts after Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston L
Rev 697, 702-10 (2003).
240 See Sterk, 94 Mich L Rev at 1198-1204, 1207-08 (cited in note 12); William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 13
(Belknap 2003).
241 See Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine
Speech, 82 Fordham L Rev 1629, 1666 (2014); Harry H, Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale L J 1105, 1109 (1979).
242 See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech,
61 Hastings L J 1083 (2010); Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on
Copyright Law, 35 Hofstra L Rev 1169 (2007); Netanel, Copyright'sParadox (cited in note
157); Patterson, 40 Vand L Rev 1 (cited in note 157); Bauer, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev 831
(cited in note 157).
243 Tushnet, 114 Yale L J at 540 (cited in note 61).
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"form of censorship.."244 Several scholars have suggested broader
exemptions to copyright protections in order to accommodate free
245
speech concerns.
The natural starting point for exploring this scholarship remains Professor Melville Nimmer's classic 1970 article, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranteesof Free Speech
and Press?,which first identified the "largely ignored paradox" of
the Copyright Act forbidding speech.246 Several decades later, Professor Netanel picked up these themes in a number of works, including a book247 and several articles.248 Netanel has argued that
much of modern copyright law exceeds constitutional free speech
limits.249 Netanel's critique is not based on the fair use doctrine,
per se; rather, it looks holistically at all copyright law, shining
light on numerous doctrines such as the tests for determining
nonliteral infringing copying.250 After the Supreme Court's ruling
in Golan,251 Netanel argued that the Supreme Court had adopted
Nimmer's proposed "definitional balancing" by constitutionalizing the fair use doctrine and what is called the idea-expression
dichotomy.252 However, Netanel was less interested in sketching
out the scope of the fair use doctrine as required by the constitutional guarantee of free speech.253
Tushnet's justly celebrated Copy This Essay: How Fair Use
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It is the

244 Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorshipof the Internet, 8 Seton Hall
Const L J 693, 693 (1998).
245 See generally Chemerinsky, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 83 (cited in note 239); C. Edwin
Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand L Rev 891 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld,
The Freedom of Imagination:Copyright's Constitutionality,112 Yale L J 1 (2012); Netanel,
54 Stan L Rev 1 (cited in note 239); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraintson Enclosureof the Public Domain, 74 NYU L Rev 354 (1999).
246 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L Rev 1180, 1181 (1970). Another notable article published that same year was Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 70 Colum
L Rev 983 (1970), which touched on many of the same issues.
247 See generally Netanel, Copyright'sParadox (cited in note 157).
248 See generally Netanel, 60 UCLA L Rev 1082 (cited in note 87); Netanel, 54 Stan L
Rev 1 (cited in note 239); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchyand Copyright in Our
System of Free Expression, 53 Vand L Rev 1879 (2000); Netanel, 51 Vand L Rev 217 (cited
in note 98); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L
J 283 (1996).
249 See Netanel, Copyright'sParadox at 109-53 (cited in note 157).
250 Id at 59-60.
251 See text accompanying notes 82-86.
252 Netanel, 60 UCLA L Rev at 1085-86 (cited in note 87).
253 Id at 1112-13. Netanel did note several troubling aspects of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Harper& Row. Id at 1105.
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most direct exploration of how fair use doctrine must be viewed
in light of free speech concerns. Tushnet has celebrated the focus
of fair use doctrine in recent years on transformativeness; she has
agreed that transformative uses should generally be viewed as
fair. At the same time, she has argued that transformativeness
cannot be the sine qua non of fair use doctrine, as it is excessively
narrow. Even with her recommendation that personal, noncommercial uses also be considered fair uses, she has acknowledged
that she "[has] no [ ] solution to offer,"254 adding that "[a] judicial
attitude of tolerance toward copying that is not quantitatively
large would help when fair use cases were actually litigated, but
any standard would be difficult to codify and would still subject
many uses to a chilling uncertainty."255
While our Article touches on many of the same concerns as
the fascinating free speech-copyright literature, our aim is different. We do not attempt to draw the boundary lines between the
concerns of free speech and copyright. Rather, we seek to explicate the proper scope of the fair use doctrine. That said, we
acknowledge that our approach may contribute to understanding
how to harmonize the concerns of copyright law with those of free
speech law. We argue that our doctrine offers an easier way to
accommodate the tension-one that has been alluded to by the
Supreme Court in the years since Tushnet wrote her essay. Essentially, our version of the fair use doctrine would involve a
broadening and a reinterpretation of the doctrine that would
cover enough speech to take care of the free speech concerns.
B. Spillovers
Another body of scholarly work whose concerns clearly overlap with ours is one addressing the issue of positive externalities.
In an impressive body of work, Professor Brett Frischmann,
alone256 and with Professor Mark Lemley,27 has discussed the important phenomenon of positive externalities ("spillovers," in his
terminology) and its importance for policymaking in the realm of
intellectual property. The gist of Frischmann's theory is that

Tushnet, 114 Yale L J at 587 (cited in note 61).
Id at 588.
256 See generally Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 Rev L & Econ 649 (2007); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 801 (2009).
257 See generally Brett M. Frischmann and Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum L
Rev 257 (2007).
254
255
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since intellectual goods produce many important spillovers for
society, it would be unwise to grant strong protection to copyright owners lest the all-important spillovers be lost.258 Our theory touches on many of the concerns addressed by the work of
Frischmann and others-such as Lemley, 259 Professor Katherine
Strandburg, Professor Michael Meurer,260 and Professor Michael
Carroll26L-but as far as the bottom line is concerned, our theory
diverges from these in critical respects.
Not only does our theory not depend on the concept of spillovers, but also we believe that the presence of spillovers actually
mitigates in favor of stronger author rights, all things being
equal. The accepted lore in economics is that all externalitiesnegative and positive alike-present a similar challenge.262 When
actors fail to take account of negative externalities, they are likely
to carry out too much of the activity. When it is positive externalities that they overlook, actors are likely to carry out too little of
the activity.263 A central, though by no means exclusive, strategy
for countering over- or underproduction of an activity is internalization.26 When the actor has to fully bear the costs of negative
externalities and may fully realize the gains of positive externalities, the actor's cost-benefit analysis will mirror society's, and the
actor will undertake the socially optimal amount of the activity.
As Professor Harold Demsetz famously observed, property rights
implement a strategy of internalization by giving an owner a set
of exclusive rights regarding an asset. 265 This is true even if the
asset in question is intangible. It is unsurprising, therefore, that
Professor Polk Wagner has pointed out that in the intellectual
property domain, stronger protection may actually create more
information for the public than weak protection.266
See Frischmann, 3 Rev L & Econ at 669-72 (cited in note 256).
259 See Lemley, 83 Tex L Rev at 1046-69 (cited in note 99).
260 See Michael J. Meurer and Katherine J. Strandburg, PatentCarrots and Sticks: A
Model of Nonobviousness, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 547, 558-65 (2008).
261 See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St L J 1361, 1419-21 (2009).
262 See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J Legal Stud 21, 22 (2009);
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 347-57 (1967)
(arguing that property rights arise to effect internalization of externalities, both positive
and negative); Ariel Porat, Private Productionof Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested
Benefits, 108 Mich L Rev 189, 190 (2009).
263 Dari-Mattiacci, 38 J Legal Stud at 22 (cited in note 262).
264 Id.
265 Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 349-50 (cited in note 262).
266 See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum L Rev 995, 1024 (2003).
258
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To be sure, as Professor Coase, Demsetz, and others have observed, absolute property rights are not a panacea. 267 Setting up
and enforcing property rights is not costless.268 Regulation or
other nonproperty methods may prove more cost-effective in incentivizing the optimal level of activity.69 Likewise, the initial allocation of property rights may prove "sticky" as a result of high
transaction costs, making property rights inferior at times to regulated access. As we noted, the nonrivalrous nature of consuming
intellectual property goods may make it worthwhile to allocate
certain uses directly to users. 2 0 Indeed, as Demsetz pointed out
in his response to the literature on spillovers, the desirability of
property rights is highly context dependent.21 From an economic
standpoint, there is no universally correct approach. The appropriate response to externalities depends on the relative costs and
expected benefits of different methods of incentivizing behavior.
But certainly one cannot conclude from the mere presence of positive externalities that it is societally beneficial to deny the owner
the right to capture the value of those externalities.
The theory we develop here is independent of the concept of
spillovers. Ours is an allocative theory that strives to divide uses
of expressive works such that certain types of uses will initially
be allocated to consumers in order to save on transaction costs
and encourage uses otherwise favored by the state. On our vision,
certain uses of works are of such great significance to the public
that they must be allocated to it, at least in principle. We allow
courts the power to change the initial allocation in appropriate
cases, but not because of the existence of spillovers. Rather, courts
can take away uses from the public and shift them to authors if
doing so is absolutely necessary to preserve incentives to create.
In this sense, our theory converges with the market-failure theory: like Professor Gordon,272 we believe that uses that threaten to
undermine incentives to create should be judicially reapportioned.
267 See Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 15 (cited in note 32); Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 35459 (cited in note 262); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv L Rev 713, 741-44 (1996).
268 Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 353-54 (cited in note 262).
269 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 NC L Rev 87, 129-39 (2004) (propos-

ing a regulatory approach to copyright, instead of a property rights approach); Kaplow and
Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 741-44 (cited in note 267) (arguing that, in some instances,
liability rules may be less costly than property rules for copyright enforcement).
270 See Part II.B. See also Lunney, 82 BU L Rev at 979, 993-94 (cited in note 11).
271 Harold Demsetz, Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory of Property Rights" 4
Rev L & Econ 127, 128-29 (2008).
272 See generally Gordon, 50 J Copyright Society USA 149 (cited in note 7).
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Other Fair Use Theories

Fair use is not only one of the most litigated topics in the law,
27 3
but it is also one of the most frequently commented on. It is
simply not possible within the scope of a law review article to give
proper credit and acknowledgement to the many invaluable scholarly contributions to thinking about fair use. That said, there are
only a small number of comprehensive attempts at rethinking the
theory behind the fair use doctrine and recrafting the doctrine accordingly. In this Section, we distinguish our comprehensive attempt from two others-one by Professor William Fisher, and another one by one of us. We also address doctrinal analyses by
Professor Glynn Lunney and Professor Samuelson that share
some interesting features with our approach in this Article.
1. Fair use and allocative efficiency.
In his ambitious 1988 article, published after the controversial
Harper& Row decision by the Supreme Court, Fisher suggests two
possible lines along which fair use doctrine might be reformulated.
One possible approach is using the fair use doctrine to promote certain views of the "good society.274 The other, which is much closer
275
to our concerns in this Article, is allocative efficiency.
In suggesting an allocative-efficiency approach to the fair use
doctrine, Fisher shares our basic assumption: that the fair use
doctrine aims to allocate certain uses directly to the public in order to reduce the inefficiency of the copyright owner's monopoly
power, while still retaining the minimum incentives necessary for
the creation of copyrighted works.276 However, Fisher chooses a
more direct strategy for allocating uses to the public. Rather than
identify categories of presumptive fair uses, as we have done,
Fisher calls for measuring all potential uses of all similar works
whenever a fair use is claimed. For each of these uses, Fisher calls
on judges to estimate two items: the amount of incentives that
would be created for the author if the use were found unfair (that
is, the profit the author could realize by selling the use) and the
societal-efficiency loss that would be engendered by finding the
273 Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 552 (cited in note 1) (noting that "the concept of fair use
ha[s] attracted an enormous amount of scholarly attention'); Goldstein, 31 Colum J L
& Arts at 433 (cited in note 134) (describing fair use as "the great white whale of American
copyright law").
274 Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1695-96 (cited in note 97).
275 Id.
276 Id at 1715-17.
...
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use unfair (that is, the loss to society resulting from the owner not
licensing a use).277 A high ratio between the two would indicate
that the use is not fair; a low ratio would show that the use is fair.
The cutoff point between high and low should be set at the use
with the highest marginal aggregate social gain (gain to society
from creation minus loss to society from monopoly control over
uses) .278

Fisher's approach is obviously appealing in that it seeks to
reach a more precise allocation of rights and privileges between
author and public. If Fisher's method could be followed by judges,
fair use could achieve precise allocative efficiency, ensuring that
authors receive as much incentive as necessary to create while
leaving for the public whatever is unnecessary.
Unfortunately, Fisher's method also appears to be impossible
to implement in the real world. It requires of judges extensive
knowledge of the entire field of creative works, potential uses, and
values to society. These factors change over time, so judges could
not consistently rely on prior rulings; essentially, each judge facing a fair use decision would have to recalculate and set the bar
anew. It is not surprising, therefore, that even Fisher acknowledges that the framework he constructs is impractical.279 Thus,
while Fisher's approach is important for understanding the tradeoffs involved in fair use decisions, his proposal offers little purchase to judges and actors.
Interestingly, Fisher's suggestions for a fair use doctrine oriented around promoting the aims of a "good society" come closer
to our doctrinal approach because they privilege certain kinds of
uses, such as education.280
2. Fair use and custom.
A different approach at regularizing fair use doctrine aims
to anchor it in custom. A 2004 article by Professor Michael
Madison,281 as well as a 1997 article by one of us, 282 suggests that
fair use doctrine can be reorganized around existing social practices. The 1997 article proposes a focused analysis on a particular

Id.
Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1715-17 (cited in note 97).
279 Id at 1739.
280 Id at 1769-72.
281 Madison, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1622-77 (cited in note 124).
282 See Parchomovsky, 3 Legal Theory at 349 (cited in note 37).
277
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social concern, namely, the reciprocity of risk.283 Fair use, on this
understanding, should shield infringements by users who are
themselves authors whose own works can be similarly infringed.284 This is not as narrow a reading of fair use as it might
seem on first blush, given the low bar for the creation of protected
works under copyright. Indeed, it would be unusual if users of
copyrighted works could not be considered authors. The article
therefore proposes limiting fair use findings to users or authors
whose practices fall within extant societal norms. 2 5 In those
cases, the risks imposed by the purported fair use can be considered to be the kinds of reciprocal risks that escape legal liability,
since penalizing such risks would do little more than incur ad28 6
ministrative costs.
Madison's piece undertakes a far broader review of the state
of fair use law, though its ambitions for rewriting fair use law are
more limited. Madison's analysis is grounded in the case law, and
it abstracts from the cases to broader principles. In general,
Madison argues that fair use cases fall into patterns clustered
around certain social contexts and associated customs, and that
fair use law should aim to enforce societal expectations of legitimate use. 28 7 Reciprocity is important to Madison, but "the patternoriented approach does not require evidence of reciprocal behavior as such in all cases.288 Rather, "[i]t requires commonality of
behavior and expectation."289
In this Article, our approach is different. We do not seek to
identify extant societal behavior that ought to be protected
through fair use doctrine, nor do we seek to enforce it through
reinterpretation of fair use. Our organizing principle for the law
of fair use is not reciprocity of risk or the assumption of efficient
societal norms. Rather, it is the centrality of the fair use doctrine
for allocating copyright-related rights and privileges efficiently.
3. Presumptive fair use.
Another interesting perspective on the fair use doctrine can
be found in Lunney's 2002 article on the Sony decision and its
283 Id.
284 Id at 370-71.
285 Id.
286 Parchomovsky, 3 Legal Theory at 370-71 (cited in note 37).
287 Madison, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1687 (cited in note 124).
288

289

Id at 1635.
Id.
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proper place in fair use analysis.290 Nominally, Lunney's article
aims only to correct a long-standing misinterpretation of the Sony
decision. In fact, Lunney's article strives for something far more
ambitious. Presenting fair use as the means for balancing between copyright's conflicting goals of incentivizing creation and
encouraging use of creative works, Lunney argues that essentially all uses should be presumed fair.291 In Lunney's account, the

reason that the time shifting in Sony was a fair use was not because it was small enough that it was likely to be foiled by transaction costs. 292 Rather, it was fair because, like all uses, it was to
be considered fair unless the copyright owner could show that the
use caused great loss to the owner-which in that case was a bur293
den the copyright owner could not meet.
In general, Lunney suggests that the proper test for fair use
ought to presume that all uses are fair unless proved otherwise,
and also suggests that owners should be able to prove that uses
are unfair only by demonstrating both that the use has an adverse
effect on the market for the creation, and that the adverse effect
would affect marginal incentives for production. 294 Lunney's version of fair use, in other words, is even broader than ours, as it
makes all uses of copyrighted works presumptively fair. Nonetheless, Lunney's approach shares a great deal with ours. Like us,
Lunney views fair use as an allocative tool for balancing the incentive effects of granting rights to authors with the benefits of
widespread use of works created by public privileges to unlicensed
use of creative works. Like us, Lunney suggests that fair use doctrine can best be shaped to this allocative function by viewing at
least some uses as presumptively fair.295 However, we believe that
a fair use doctrine that views all uses as presumptively fair
strikes the wrong allocative balance.
An interesting contrast with Lunney's approach is provided by
Samuelson's Unbundling Fair Uses. As noted above, Samuelson
emphasizes the degree to which extant fair use law is clustered

290 See generally Lunney, 82 BU L Rev 975 (cited in note 11).
291 See id at 996, 1022-23.
292 See id at 976-77, 992-96.
293 Id at 982, 991-92.
294 Lunney, 82 BU L Rev at 981-85, 999 (cited in note 11).
295 Others have suggested more limited use of the presumption of fair use. See generally, for example, Greenberg, 85 U Colo L Rev 53 (cited in note 8); Ned Snow, ProvingFair
Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 Cardozo L Rev 1781 (2010); Samuelson, 77
Fordham L Rev 2537 (cited in note 134).
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around what she calls "policy-relevant" patterns. 296 In privileging
some uses by giving them the status of presumptive fair uses,
while denying that status to other uses, our proposal echoes a pattern of extant fair use law that is both identified and lauded by
Samuelson. Samuelson cautiously suggests that existing fair use
law is normatively sound, as it befits treatment of copyright as
"limited monopoly.297 She too proposes limited burden shifting,
writing that
[g]iven the important role that fair use plays in mediating
tensions between copyright law and the First Amendment
and other constitutional values, it would be appropriate for
the burden of showing unfairness to be on the copyright
owner. .. . At the very least, copyright owners should bear
the burden of proving unfairness in free speech/expression,
298
personal use, and litigation use cases.
While neither Lunney nor Samuelson replicates our theoretical approach or doctrinal prescriptions, the doctrinal implications of their suggestions belong to the same family of approaches
as ours.
CONCLUSION

Fair use is the principal mechanism employed by copyright
law to balance the interests of authors and copyright-reliant industries against those of the public. It is therefore not surprising
that it has attracted considerable attention from copyright theorists, who offer myriad theories to justify and explicate this remarkable doctrine.
In this Article, we have offered a novel approach to the fair
use doctrine based on two central insights. First, we show that
the fair use doctrine is best understood as an allocative tool that
grants use categories directly to users to ensure efficient utilization of the rights associated with copyright. Second, we show that
the categories allocated to users by the fair use doctrine should be
those that provide follow-on users with significant nonpecuniary
benefits.
Our novel approach to the fair use doctrine can provide some
needed clarity and coherence to a doctrine that has puzzled scholars and confounded courts. Naturally, in a scholarly space rife
296
297
298

Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at 2541-42 (cited in note 134).
Id at 2617-18.
Id (citation omitted).
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with many outstanding preexisting contributions, it is impossible
to be completely innovative. Indeed, as we point out throughout
the Article, on various dimensions our theory overlaps with preexisting ones. Like many others before us, we also clearly benefit
from standing on the shoulders of giants. Yet the core theoretical
thesis, as well as the enumeration of fair and unfair use categories we advance, breaks new ground and can introduce a great deal
of coherence and clarity into judicial determinations and academic discussions of the most remarkable doctrine in the entire
world of copyright.

